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In the first paper, I use industry-level data to investigate the impact of exchange rate 
arrangements on the productive structure of the economy. The identification strategy 
has similarities with the methodology followed in the literature on heterogeneous 
effects of financial development. A de facto exchange rate regime classification is 
used to sort pegs and floats. My findings suggest that industries that have higher 
working capital needs grow faster under exchange rate stability. A fixed exchange 
rate regime could lower currency or country risk, leading to greater availability of 
funds and a reduction in the cost of financing. Since loans are often denominated in 
foreign currency or indexed to the exchange rate in developing countries, firms with 
higher working capital needs would prefer exchange rate stability, which may lower 
interest rates in foreign currency and provide easier access to credit. 
  
The second paper investigates the behavior of output across large devaluations and 
depreciations. First, I define a currency crisis as an episode in which the nominal 
exchange rate increases by 15%. Then I proceed to classify them into devaluations 
and depreciations using Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) exchange rate classification. 
Once these episodes are sorted out, I analyze the behavior of output across them.  
As in previous studies, I find that the majority of the currency crisis episodes have 
been contractionary for 1970-2007. When I separate currency crisis episodes between 
devaluations and depreciations, I find that the former have been associated with larger 
output losses for middle income economies.  
These findings are consistent with the fact that middle income countries are often 
subject to currency mismatches. As a result, they may opt for an exchange rate regime 
that exhibits relatively more stability. This is well documented in Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002), a behavior they termed “fear of floating”. However, in the case of a currency 
crisis, the negative impact on output growth is likely to be larger for countries that 
have adopted a fixed exchange rate regime. This result is also supported by the larger 
magnitude of the estimated output losses when we use a higher threshold to define 
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The analysis presented in the next two chapters investigates the relationship between 
exchange rate arrangements and the behavior of output. The first essay explores the 
impact of exchange rate regimes on economic performance across industries. The 
second essay, on the other hand, examines the role played by exchange rate regimes 
on the behavior of output around currency crisis episodes. Economic theory does not 
provide a clear cut relationship between nominal exchange rate arrangements and 
economic performance. A nominal exchange rate regime could potentially affect 
growth and volatility through several mechanisms: through international trade, by 
lowering currency risk, by insulating the economy from monetary or real shocks, and 
by providing insurance against currency fluctuations in the presence of currency 
mismatches. 
The second chapter of my dissertation aims to shed light on the impact of exchange 
rate arrangements on the productive structure of the economy. My analysis will differ 
in several respects from previous studies. First, I use industry-level data rather than 
country-level data. The main advantage of this approach is that it allows for 
heterogeneous effects across industries that could be masked in the aggregate. For a 
given country, a fixed exchange rate regime could exert a positive effect on growth or 
volatility in some industries, while having a negative effect in some others. In order to 
investigate the impact of exchange rate arrangements on the productive structure of 




methodology followed in the literature on heterogeneous effects of financial 
development. 
Second, I use a de facto exchange rate regime classification constructed by Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) to determine if a country has adopted peg or a float. The rationale 
is straightforward. Unlike the official classification given by the central bank’s 
intended regime, this classification keeps track of the actual behavior of the exchange 
rate. De jure classifications reflect the declared intentions of countries, and they 
generally do not accurately characterize the actual behavior of central banks. 
I conjecture that industries which have higher liquidity needs are bound to experience 
higher growth rates and lower volatility under fixed exchange rate arrangements than 
under more flexible regimes. My findings suggest that these industries grow faster 
under exchange rate stability. However, I find little empirical support to the 
hypothesis that the exchange rate arrangement is important in reducing output 
volatility in industries with higher working capital needs.  
One plausible explanation of these findings could be that a fixed exchange rate 
regime reduces currency or country risk, which could potentially translate into greater 
availability of funds through the domestic financial system and a reduction in the cost 
of financing. Another possible explanation could be given by the degree of liability 
dollarization in many developing countries. A more stable exchange rate regime 
would benefit those sectors that have to borrow more, since loans are generally 
denominated in foreign currency or indexed to the exchange rate. All else equal, firms 
would prefer more exchange rate stability, which may lower interest rates in foreign 




borrowing costs and increase the availability of funds, and hence, having a positive 
differential impact on industries with higher working capital needs. 
The third chapter provides yet another contribution to the existing literature of 
currency crises. This paper investigates the role played by different exchange rate 
arrangements in output performance around a currency crisis episode. In other words, 
I investigate output responses across large devaluations and depreciations. First, I 
follow a similar approach to Frankel and Rose (1996) and define a currency crisis as 
an episode in which the nominal exchange rate increases by 15%. Then I proceed to 
classify them into devaluations and depreciations using the natural exchange rate 
classification by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Once these episodes are sorted out, I 
analyze the behavior of output across them.  
The traditional textbook expenditure-switching effect suggests that large devaluations 
(depreciations) can be expansionary. A nominal devaluation (depreciation) would 
translate into a real devaluation (depreciation) in the short-run under wage and price 
stickiness, stimulating exports and discouraging imports, and increasing employment 
and output. Therefore, if expenditure-switching is the main acting mechanism, a 
nominal devaluation (depreciation) is likely to lead to increased production in traded 
goods, higher net exports, and an improvement of the external position of the country 
in question. 
However, under certain circumstances, depreciations and devaluations can be costly 
in terms of output. A sharp increase in the exchange rate could have contractionary 
effects, working through channels such as wealth effects on aggregate demand, higher 




(depreciation) in the presence of liability dollarization, and disruption in credit 
markets and capital inflows which might limit the possibility of importing capital 
goods used in production.  
As in previous studies, I find that the majority of the currency crisis episodes have 
been contractionary for the 1970-2007. When I separate currency crisis episodes 
between devaluations and depreciations, I find that the former have been more 
contractionary for middle income economies. The distinction is important because 
middle income countries are in general more open to international credit markets and 
receive a larger proportion of portfolio capital inflows, making them vulnerable to 
capital flows reversals and sharp depreciations of their exchange rates (Hutchinson 
and Noy (2002)).  
I interpret these results as follows. Middle income countries are often subject to 
liability dollarization and currency mismatches. As a result, they may opt for an 
exchange rate regime that exhibits relatively more stability. This is well documented 
in Calvo and Reinhart (2002), showing that many developing countries constantly 
intervene in currency markets to reduce exchange rate variability, a behavior they 
termed “fear of floating”. However, in case of a sharp increase in the exchange rate –
a currency crisis—, the negative impact on output growth is likely to be larger for 
countries that adopted a fixed exchange rate regime. This result is also supported by 
the larger magnitude of the estimated output losses when we adopt a higher threshold 











Economic theory does not provide a clear relationship between nominal exchange 
rate arrangements and economic performance. In principle, since the exchange rate 
regime is just another aspect of monetary policy, it should have no effect on long-run 
growth if money is neutral in the long-run. 
Many papers have looked at different mechanisms through which exchange rate 
arrangements could influence long-run output growth and volatility. A nominal 
exchange rate regime could potentially affect growth and volatility by promoting 
international trade, lowering currency risk, insulating the economy from monetary or 
real shocks, or by simply providing free insurance against domestic currency 
fluctuations in the presence of currency mismatches in the balance sheets of economic 
agents. For instance, a fixed exchange rate regime can foster international trade and 
foreign direct investment by reducing uncertainty and relative price volatility. If 
lower transaction costs come hand in hand with exchange rate stability, both 
importers and exporters could benefit from a peg. A relatively stable exchange rate 
could also increase foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, with all the benefits 
associated with these flows such as new processes and production technologies, 




Calvo and Reinhart (2000a) provide an excellent survey on the literature that 
examines the link between trade and exchange rate volatility. The results are in 
general mixed. However, when it concerns to emerging markets, empirical evidence 
seems to lean towards a negative impact of exchange rate variability on trade. The 
authors advance a few explanations in their paper. First, they note that invoicing 
patterns are relevant to determine the effects of exchange rate volatility on exports 
and imports. For emerging economies, prices are quoted in US dollars or some other 
hard currency in the majority of cases. Second, markets are far from being complete. 
Both exporters and importers generally do not have full access to tools to hedge 
against exchange rate risk
1
 in emerging market economies. Hence, large fluctuations 
in the exchange rate could exert a negative effect on trade.  
Edwards (1998) examines the trade channel using different indexes of trade policy 
and finds support for a positive relationship between openness and total factor 
productivity growth. Endogeneity problems and disagreements about how to measure 
openness have been the focus of subsequent research (for a discussion, see Rodriguez 
and Rodrik, 2000). Frankel and Romer (1999) instrument trade using countries’ 
geographic characteristics and find evidence that trade has a significant positive 
impact on growth. But even if exchange rate stability does foster trade, the empirical 
evidence that relates trade with growth is mixed at best.  
Dornbusch (2001) emphasizes the potential benefit of adopting a peg on currency 
risk. A fixed exchange rate regime could bring lower currency risk, and therefore, 
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 Wei (1999), however, finds little empirical support for the hypothesis that the availability of hedging 




lower interest rates and reduce the borrowing costs of capital for domestic firms in 
credit markets. If lower currency risk were to increase the amount of capital inflows 
and the credit available to domestic firms, firms’ time horizons will lengthen, 
generating a positive effect on investment and growth. Conversely, if agents have 
doubts about the credibility of the peg, currency risk will increase, resulting in higher 
borrowing costs and limited access to credit for domestic firms. Shambaugh (2004) 
examines the relation between monetary policy in the base country and the country 
adopting a peg. According to his findings, interest rates in countries that adopt a peg 
seem to follow more closely the interest rates of the base country
2
 than in countries 
that adopt a float. Therefore, adopting a fixed exchange rate regime could potentially 
translate into a mechanism that provides greater credibility for developing countries 
with histories of high inflation or poorly managed monetary policy. 
The optimal choice of exchange rate regime for an open economy depends on several 
factors. For instance, under sticky prices, fixed exchange rate regimes provide better 
insulation for the economy against temporary monetary shocks. Flexible exchange 
rate regimes, on the other hand, fare better against temporary real shocks. When a real 
shock takes place, the nominal exchange rate can adjust quickly, simultaneously 
correcting the real exchange rate. Thus, by allowing for relative price changes and 
requiring smaller adjustments when a real shock occurs, a flexible exchange regime 
possesses better insulation properties against these type of shocks in the presence of 
sticky prices, such as in the Mundell-Fleming model. This conventional wisdom has 
been questioned by Lahiri, Singh, and Végh (2007), who show that the type of 
underlying market friction could play an important role in the choice of the exchange 
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rate regime. Under credit market frictions, floats provide better insulation properties 
against monetary shocks, whereas pegs fare better against real shocks. 
Several empirical studies find that the short-term response of output to terms-of-trade 
shocks is smaller in developing countries that adopted flexible exchange rate 
arrangements. For example, Broda (2004) uses a panel VAR to study the insulation 
properties of different exchange rate regimes and finds that floats have better 
insulation properties for terms-of-trade shocks than pegs. Edwards and Levy-Yeyati 
(2003) also evaluate the effect of terms-of-trade shocks in a panel of 183 countries for 
the post-Bretton Woods era. They also report that the more rigid the exchange rate 
regime, the larger the volatility of output in the short-run. Finally, Magud (2005, 
2008) suggests that the degree of openness of an economy should not be ignored 
when choosing an exchange rate regime in the presence of balance sheet effects.  
If there is a link between output volatility and output growth, then exchange rate 
regimes that reduce output volatility could contribute positively to higher long-term 
growth. Ramey and Ramey (1995) present evidence that output volatility has a 
negative effect on economic growth.  
Currency mismatches and liability dollarization are also relevant variables to consider 
when choosing an exchange rate arrangement. Currency mismatches are not 
uncommon in emerging countries. The inability of developing countries to issue debt 
denominated in domestic currency for developing countries (a phenomenon called 
“Original Sin” by Eichengreen and Hausman (1999)) may represent one important 
factor leading to liability dollarization. Firms in emerging markets are subject to 




whereas revenues are in domestic currency, especially for non-tradable sectors. The 
fact that movements in the exchange rate could exert a large negative impact on the 
finances of the firms is an important variable to take into account when evaluating the 
advantages of adopting a given exchange rate arrangement. This is most likely one of 
the reasons why many emerging markets display “fear of floating” (a phenomenon 
noted by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), in which countries state they have a flexible 
exchange rate regime, whereas their behavior resembles more of a peg).   
This paper intends to shed light on the impact of nominal exchange rate arrangements 
on the productive structure of the economy. My analysis will differ in several respects 
from previous studies. First, I use industry-level data rather than country-level data. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it allows me to examine whether different 
exchange rate regimes have heterogeneous effects on industry volatility and growth 
that are masked in the aggregate. For a given country, a fixed exchange rate regime 
could exert a positive effect on growth in some industries, while having a negative 
effect in some others. Industries that are subject to higher liquidity needs, for 
instance, could benefit from a reduction of borrowing costs or an increase in the 
availability of funds. If pegs and country risk are negatively correlated, and lower 
country risk is associated with higher levels of capital inflows and lower cost of 
capital, then these industries are likely to benefit from a fixed exchange rate regime. 
On the other hand, central bank policies to defend a peg, such as high interest rates, or 
fiscal policies that render a peg unsustainable, are likely to increase the country risk 
and the borrowing costs for domestic firms, primarily affecting those industries with 




In order to determine whether a country has a peg or a float, I use the de facto 
exchange rate regime classification constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
Unlike the official classification given by a country’s intended regime, this 
classification keeps track of the actual behavior of the exchange rate. The distinction 
between de jure and de facto behavior is important since economic agents are likely 
to plan and form expectations according to the actual behavior of the central bank. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews two strands of the 
literature. First, I make a brief account of the literature on exchange rate arrangements 
and economic performance. Then I review the literature on the heterogeneous effects 
of financial development, which will serve for my identification purposes. Section 2.3 
outlines the empirical approach. Section 2.4 describes the datasets used in this paper, 
as well as summary statistics. Section 2.5 presents the empirical results. In section 
2.6, I perform some robustness checks. Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
2.2 Related Literature 
 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between nominal exchange rate 
arrangements and economic growth. Ghosh et al. (1996), using a panel of 140 
countries for 1960-1990, find that pegs are characterized by higher volatility and 
lower output per capita growth, but this difference between regimes appears to be 
quantitatively small and statistically insignificant.  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) also examine the link between output growth 
and exchange rate regimes using data from 183 countries over the post-Bretton 




classification of exchange rate regimes (instead of using a de jure classification based 
on the regime reported by the governments). In order to construct this classification, 
they employ cluster analysis to group countries, based on the behavior of three 
variables related to the nominal exchange rate: the nominal exchange rate volatility, 
the volatility of exchange rate changes and the volatility of international reserves. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger find that growth rates under flexible exchange rate 
regimes are significantly higher than under fixed exchange rate regimes for non-
industrial economies, whereas this link seems to be of less relevance for industrial 
economies.  
Aghion et al. (2006), on the other hand, examine the relationship between growth and 
exchange rate regimes conditioning on the country’s level of financial development. 
Their findings suggest that countries with less developed financial systems benefit 
from a more stable exchange rate, while countries that are more financially developed 
fare better under a flexible exchange rate regime.  
This paper takes a different approach. Instead of relying on country-level data, I use 
industry-level manufacturing sector data to investigate the impact of nominal 
exchange rate arrangements on output volatility and growth. The identification 
approach is similar to the one first introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998) in their 
seminal work. These authors investigate whether industries that require relatively 
more external funds to finance investment (rather than internal funds) grow faster in 
countries that have more developed financial markets. In order to do that, the authors 
construct an index of dependence of external funds using data from the United States. 




technological reason that determines which industries are more dependent on external 
funds. Second, they assume these technological differences across industries are 
similar across countries. 
Several studies have used this methodological approach. For example, Braun and 
Larraín (2005) investigate the role of financial frictions in the amplification of short-
run fluctuations. The authors argue that credit tightening is likely to exert a greater 
negative effect in industries that rely primarily on external funds, whereas industries 
that finance investment and working capital using internal funds are less likely to be 
exposed to bad credit conditions. They find that industries that have higher liquidity 
needs are hit harder during downturns. In addition, the differential impact of 
recessions seems to be larger in countries that are subject to more pronounced credit 
frictions.  
Raddatz (2006) uses a similar approach to explore the relationship between financial 
development and output volatility. Using industry-level variation of the data, he 
investigates how the provision of liquidity to firms could potentially affect output 
volatility. He finds that financial development leads to a relatively greater reduction 
in the volatility of sectors that are more dependent on external financing, suggesting 
the existence of a link from financial development to volatility. The following section 
presents a brief description of the identification strategy.  
 
2.3 Empirical Approach 
 
The identification strategy I adopt in this section has similarities with the 




development. This paper explores the following hypotheses. I conjecture that 
industries which have a higher reliance on external funds are bound to experience 
higher growth rates and lower volatility under fixed exchange rate arrangements than 
under flexible exchange rate arrangements. Following Rajan and Zingales, I will 
assume for identification purposes that industries’ liquidity needs are given 
technologically and are relatively constant across countries. 
I estimate the following benchmark empirical specifications: 
 
(1)         Growthi,k,t    =  α0 + α1 x Fixed ERi,t + α2 x Other ERi,t +  
α3 x  Fixed ERi,t x Liquidity Needsk +  
α4 x Other ERi,t x Liquidity Needsk + FEi,t + FEi,k + ηi,t,k 
 
(2)         Volatilityi,k,t  = β0 + β1 x Fixed ERi,t + β2 x Other ERi,t +  
β3 x  Fixed ERi,t x Liquidity Needsk +  
β4 x Other ERi,t x Liquidity Needsk + FEi,t + FEi,k + εi,t,k 
 
 
where the dependent variable is either the growth rate of real gross industry output or 
the volatility of the growth rate of gross industry output (computed over 5-year non-
overlapping periods) and i, t, and k indicate country, period, and industry 
respectively. 
Fixed ERi,t is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the regime is classified as a peg or a 




dummy that takes a value of 1 if the regime was classified as freely falling or as a 
dual exchange rate regime in Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification, and 0 otherwise.  
If a country adopts a fixed exchange regime in the majority of years over a five-year 
period, that country-period observation is classified as a fixed exchange regime. 
Similarly, a regime is classified as relatively flexible if it is coded as a float or a 
managed floating regime for the majority of years over a five-year period. However, 
if any country-year observation during a five-year period falls into the freely falling 
category, that country-period observation is automatically classified in the freely 
falling and no parallel market data category, or in other words, the Other ERi,t dummy 
takes a value of one. The freely falling category is treated differently than flexible 
regimes due to the adverse effect that high inflation has on growth and volatility. The 
excluded variable is the dummy for relatively flexible regimes (floats and managed 
floats). 
Liquidity Needsk is a measure of liquidity needs that is assumed to be industry-
specific. I use both Rajan and Zingales’ External Finance Needs and Raddatz’s Cash 
Conversion Cycle to characterize a firm’s need for external financing as opposed to 
internal financing (Section 2.4.3 provides a description of these two measures). I am 
interested in the coefficients on the interactions between the different exchange rate 
arrangements and these measures of liquidity needs. I include country-industry and 
period-industry fixed effects in all regressions.  
I expect to find that industries that have higher liquidity needs exhibit higher growth 
and lower volatility under a peg, so that α3>0 in the growth regression while β3<0 in 




may be associated with lower country risk, which may lower borrowing costs and 
lead to greater availability of funds for domestic firms.  
 
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
2.4.1 Data Sources 
I use data from different sources. Industry data was obtained from the UNIDO 
Indstat-3 (2005) dataset. This dataset provides yearly observations for 28 isic-3 
manufacturing industries for a large number of countries for the period 1963-2003. 
This is an unbalanced panel, and countries in the UNIDO database are skewed 
towards high-income and middle-income countries, since more disaggregated data is 
generally not available for many low or lower middle income countries.  
For trade data on exports and imports, I use the UN COMTRADE database. Data on 
country variables was obtained from different sources, mainly from the World 
Development Indicators database of the World Bank. Finally, liquidity needs and 
other industry-specific measures were borrowed from Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
Braun and Larraín (2005) and Raddatz (2006). 
Table 2.1 summarizes the average real gross output growth and the real gross output 
volatility by industry for the post Bretton-Woods period (1974-2003). The average 
growth rate is computed for each country-industry pair, and then averaged across 
countries. Output volatility is the average volatility of real gross output for each 
industry in the manufacturing sector for 1974-2003. Industry volatility is the standard 




overlapping periods are 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 
and 1999-2003.  
In terms of real gross output growth, Table 2.1 shows that Footwear (except rubber or 
plastic), Textiles, and Miscellaneous Petroleum and Coal Products have been among 
the slowest growing industries for the period in consideration. On the other hand, 
Plastic Products, Professional and Scientific Equipment, and Machinery (except 
industrial) have been among the fastest growing industries in the manufacturing 
sector. 
In terms of real gross output volatility, Food Products, Textiles, and Other Non-
Metallic Mineral Products show very low volatility relative to other industries in the 
manufacturing sector. Miscellaneous Petroleum and Coal Products, Pottery, China 
and Earthenware, and Professional and Scientific Equipment are among the most 
volatile industries for the period in consideration.  
To study the impact of the exchange rate regime on industry growth and volatility, I 
use a de facto exchange rate regime classification that keeps track of actual behavior, 
rather than the official or de jure regime that represents declared behavior. It is not 
uncommon for governments to announce a float when the actual behavior of the 
central bank resembles more closely a peg. Conversely, a peg could resemble a float 
if the government constantly devalues its currency. The distinction is important since 
economic agents are likely to plan and form expectations according to the actual 
behavior of the central bank.
3
 I provide a brief description of some of the most 
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 Because this paper focuses more on differences at the industry level, I do not investigate the potential 
role of deviations from de jure regimes. Since I use five-year averages, there is no straightforward way 




commonly used classifications below. 
 
2.4.2 Choosing among de Facto Exchange Rate Classifications 
In many cases Central Banks’ actual behavior differs greatly from the announced 
regime. For instance, many countries that claim to be running a float resort to 
frequent intervention in exchange rate markets (a behavior that is closer to a peg than 
a float). On the other hand, some countries with pegs resort to frequent devaluations 
of their currency, which causes the exchange rate to resemble a float rather than a 
peg. The bottom line is that the announced regime does not always relate closely to 
the actual regime. 
Until recently, most empirical work was based on the legal or de jure exchange rate 
regime announced by national governments and compiled in the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. This 
classification is mainly based on countries’ self-declarations. De jure classifications 
reflect the declared intentions of countries, and they generally do not accurately 
characterize the actual behavior of central banks. Deviations from the central bank’s 
preannounced exchange rate arrangement are likely to have a detrimental impact on 
the credibility of domestic monetary policy, increasing uncertainty in currency 
markets and risk premia charged on liabilities issued in domestic currencies.  
Several variables can be taken into account when constructing a de facto exchange 
rate classification. Intervention data such as interest rates and international reserves, 
parallel market data, and the time period elapsed without changes in the nominal 
                                                                                                                                           
for example, explore the determinants of reneging on announced exchange rate arrangements using 




exchange rate are among several variables used to determine whether exchange rate 
stability is arising from the absence of shocks or from the central bank’s actions to 
actively manage the exchange rate.  
Calvo and Reinhart (2000a), for example, study the behavior of floaters using 
information on the volatility of the exchange rate, reserves, and interest rates for 
declared floating economies relative to the world’s major economies that can float 
relatively freely. They show that many countries that claim to have a float in place 
keep constantly intervening to reduce exchange rate variability. Calvo and Reinhart 
named this behavior “fear of floating”.  
In order to adjust for these differences, I use a de facto classification of the exchange 
rate regime rather than a de jure classification reported by countries. Several attempts 
have been carried out to provide a more realistic taxonomy. Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003, 2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and Shambaugh (2004) are 
some of the most prominent efforts in this direction. 
Early attempts, such as Ghosh et al. (1997), extend the IMF classification into a more 
informative taxonomy. For example, under their classification, countries that realign 
their pegs more than once a year are not classified as such. 
In an effort to construct a better taxonomy of exchange rate arrangements, Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) use both policy and outcome variables to construct a 
de facto classification to distinguish between actual and announced behavior. 
Country-year observations are sorted applying cluster analysis techniques and data on 
the volatility of international reserves, the volatility of the exchange rate, and the 




2004. Observations that show high volatility in the exchange rate variables and little 
volatility in international reserves are grouped as floats. Conversely, observations that 
display low volatility in exchange rates but high volatility in international reserves are 
grouped as pegs. Crawling pegs and dirty floats are characterized by some degree of 
volatility in all these variables.  
A few problems are associated with their methodology. First, country-year data points 
that exhibit little variability in all the variables are grouped in the inconclusive 
category by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s method. The authors resort to additional 
information in an effort to classify these observations in an uncontroversial way (for 
instance, currency boards are uncontroversial pegs). The second problem arises from 
the fact that for some country-year data points, some of the variables used to 
construct the classification are not available. Third, the ratio of international reserves 
to M2 may become unstable not because of reserve volatility but due to M2 
instability. Finally, they do not account for the potential role of interest rate policy, 
the presence of capital controls and dual exchange rates, and the differential effects of 
sterilized and unsterilized intervention. 
Shambaugh (2004) constructs another de facto classification that utilizes only one 
variable –the volatility of the exchange rate— to group country-year observations into 
pegs and non-pegs. He classifies a regime as a peg if the exchange rate remained 
within a 2 percent band against the base currency for a sufficient length of time 
(given by twelve months). The twelve-month time window is selected to distinguish 
cases in which the exchange rate has not changed due to tranquil times from cases in 




Further, to account for one-time realignments, countries that stay within the band for 
eleven out of twelve months are grouped as pegs.    
In this chapter, I will follow the natural classification of exchange rate arrangements 
constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). They use data on parallel exchange rates 
and detailed historical chronologies of exchange rate regimes that track capital 
controls and currency reforms to create a de facto classification. The advantage of 
using parallel market exchange rates rather than official rates is twofold. Parallel 
exchange rates provide a better indication of the direction of monetary policy, with 
the parallel market premium generally signaling the direction of future changes in the 
official exchange rate. Moreover, in countries where parallel markets are important, 
many economic transactions are carried out using the parallel exchange rate rather 
than the official one.  
Another advantage of using Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification is that they include a 
separate category for countries with episodes where the annual inflation rate is at least 
40 percent. This “freely falling” category also includes the first six months of cases in 
which there was an exchange rate crisis with a transition from a peg to a float. The 
main reason for including this category is to differentiate flexible regimes that exhibit 
low inflation from those that experience high inflation, given the lack of monetary 
control and the distortions associated with the latter.  
In order to group countries into different categories, Reinhart and Rogoff use their 
historical chronologies to establish whether dual, multiple or parallel markets exist. If 
there is only a unified exchange rate regime, they check whether there is an official 




announcement is in place or if the regime fails verification, and the annual inflation 
rate does not exceed 40 percent, then they classify the regime by looking at the 
behavior of the exchange rate using a five-year moving window.  
Using Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification, I group pegs and crawling pegs into the 
fixed exchange rate regime category, since the exchange rate is subject to very narrow 
bands, whereas managed floats and floats are placed in the flexible exchange rate 
category. Table 2.2 presents the average growth rate and volatility of real gross output 
by exchange rate arrangement. Regimes that are classified as freely falling or regimes 
for which parallel data is missing are grouped together in the "Other ER" category. 
For a given country and five-year period, the prevailing nominal exchange rate is 
classified as a fixed exchange rate if the country has run a peg or a crawling peg more 
than 50 percent of the time during that period. Conversely, it is classified as a flexible 
exchange rate regime if the country has had either a float or a managed float for the 
majority of the years. Finally, if one year of the five-year period falls in the freely 
falling category, the country-period observation is classified in the "Other ER" 
category. Five-year periods are non-overlapping periods. Results do not change much 
if I require that the majority of the years fall in the freely falling category.  
For the period 1974-2003, growth and volatility are higher in the sample of 
developing and middle income countries than for the sample that includes all 
countries. This difference is explained by the lower growth and volatility that 
characterizes the sample of industrial economies (not shown in the tables presented 
here). Table 2.2 suggests that fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with higher 




that this difference is statistically significant at conventional levels and amounts to 
about one percentage point for developing and middle income countries. 
While fixed exchange rate regimes also seem to be linked to higher output volatility, 
these differences are only statistically significant at conventional levels for the whole 
sample. For developing and middle income countries, Table 2.2 suggests that 
volatility levels across exchange rate regimes are about the same. 
The "Other exchange rate regime" category (freely falling and no parallel market data 
observations) –not reported in Table 2.2— are not uncommon in practice and are 
generally associated with lower growth and higher volatility compared to both fixed 
and flexible exchange rate regimes. 
 
2.4.3 Measuring Liquidity Needs 
In order to shed light on the effects of exchange rate regimes on the productive 
structure of the economy, I follow the literature on heterogeneous effects of financial 
development and I classify industries in the manufacturing sector using measures that 
describe these industries’ needs for external liquidity to finance investment and 
working capital.  
Table 2.3 introduces two measures of liquidity needs that have been widely used in 
the literature that studies the heterogeneous effects of financial development. First, I 
use the external finance dependence index developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
This measure is defined as capital expenditures net of cash flows from operations 
divided by capital expenditures and it is computed using data for publicly listed U.S. 
firms. Industries such as Tobacco, Pottery, China, Earthenware, Leather Products, and 




dependence index. On the other hand, firms in industries such as Plastic Products, 
Professional and Scientific Equipment, and Electric Machinery require a significant 
amount of external funds to finance capital expenditures.  
Two assumptions are required in order to apply the approach used by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) to our data. First, the demand for external funds in a given sector 
must be determined technologically. If this is the case, one can assume that the U.S. is 
the most developed financial market and that large U.S. corporations face a very 
elastic supply of funds, and estimate the liquidity needs for each industry. Second, we 
need that these differences across industries should also hold for other countries. 
More precisely, we need industry rankings to be preserved across countries.  
Rajan and Zingales show that their measure of external finance dependence is robust 
to using Canadian data. Raddatz (2006) constructs similar measures using data from 
non-US firms from the Worldscope database and finds that the resulting liquidity 
needs indices are positively correlated with the index built using U.S. data
4
.  
This measure of industry liquidity needs has been used in several studies. Braun and 
Larraín (2005) look at the effects of financial development on cyclical fluctuations of 
different industries using the UNIDO database for the 1963-1999 period. They find 
that industries with higher dependence on external finance are more adversely 
affected during recessions and that the more important the frictions in financial 
                                                 
4
 One caveat that might invalidate this approach is the possibility of factor intensity reversals. This 
scenario is more likely to happen in non-industrial countries, where differences in factor prices could 






markets, the larger the effect on cyclical volatility in highly dependent industries 
relative to less dependent industries. In another study, Raddatz (2006) examines the 
relationship between industry output volatility and the interaction of liquidity needs 
with measures of financial development. His findings suggest that financial 
development plays an important role in reducing the volatility of firms in sectors that 
require higher liquidity needs. 
Raddatz constructs an alternative measure of industry liquidity needs. The Cash 
Conversion Cycle is defined as the average age of inventories plus the average age of 
accounts receivable minus the average age of accounts payable (365*inventories/cost 
of goods sold + 365*accounts receivable/sales - 365*accounts payable/cost of goods 
sold). Although this measure is related to industries’ needs for external funding, it 
primarily attempts to measure the working capital and liquidity needs of a firm. The 
assumptions underlying the validity of this index are similar to those underlying 
Rajan and Zingales’ index of external dependence. 
According to the Cash Conversion Cycle measure, industries such as Petroleum 
Refineries, Food Products, and Beverages have low liquidity needs, whereas other 
industries such as Machinery, Professional and Scientific Equipment, and Leather 
Products have high liquidity needs. The correlation between these two measures is 
0.1298. The correlation is low, but positive as expected. The external finance 
dependence index is more related to long-term investment needs, whereas the cash 
conversion cycle index is linked to firms’ working capital needs. 
Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 compare output growth and volatility for industries with 




industries of Rajan and Zingales’ index to define industries that have high and low 
external finance needs (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Tests for equality of means suggest that 
the exchange rate regime does have little impact on either growth or volatility in 
industries with high and low external finance needs. Similarly, volatility is higher for 
industries that have high external finance needs under fixed exchange rate regimes, 
result that holds only for the entire sample. This difference is negligible for the 
subsamples of developing and middle income countries. 
Using the Cash Conversion Cycle as the measure of liquidity needs, Tables 2.6 and 
2.7 suggest that growth in industries with high cash conversion cycles is higher under 
pegs than under floats. Means tests indicate that this difference in growth across 
exchange rate regimes is statistically significant at conventional levels and is larger 
for developing and middle income countries than for the whole sample. On the other 
hand, real gross output growth is very similar across exchange rate arrangements for 
industries with low cash conversion cycles.  
In terms of volatility, Table 2.7 suggests that both industries that have high and low 
cash conversion cycles display higher volatility under a fixed exchange rate regime 
relative to a flexible regime for the sample that includes all countries. However, the 
choice of exchange rate arrangement seems to have no differential effect on output 
volatility across industries with high and low liquidity needs for both developing and 
middle income countries.  
I will exploit this differential impact on real gross output growth across industries 
when these are sorted using the Cash Conversion Cycle liquidity needs measure. In 




supports the hypothesis that industries with higher liquidity needs are likely to exhibit 
relatively faster growth under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 present the basic results for industries’ liquidity needs. The 
dependent variable in Table 2.8 is the average growth rate of real gross output over a 
5-year period for industries in the manufacturing sector. FIX is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of one if a fixed exchange regime was in place in the majority of the 
years during the five-year period. OTHER takes a value of one if any one year of the 
period falls into the freely falling category of Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification.
5
  
The excluded category is the flexible exchange regime category. Rajan and Zingales’ 
External Finance Dependence index (Ext. Fin.) and Raddatz’s Cash Conversion Cycle 
index (CCC) are industry specific measures of liquidity needs. Period-industry and 
country-industry fixed effects are included in all regressions.  
Columns (1) through (4) in Table 2.8 present the results for the entire sample. 
Columns (5) through (8) show the results for developing countries, whereas the 
remaining columns are for middle income countries. Columns (5) and (8) suggest that 
fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with higher growth for developing and 
middle income countries. As expected, the coefficient on OTHER is negative in all 
                                                 
5
 Results also hold if OTHER is defined as a dummy that takes a value of one if the majority of the 
years in consideration fall into either the freely falling or no parallel market data category in Reinhart 




regressions and also statistically significant in several of them, indicating that 
observations in the freely falling category are generally associated with negative 
output growth. 
Regressions in columns (2) through (4) for the whole sample include interaction 
terms between measures of liquidity needs and nominal exchange rate arrangements. 
The interaction between external finance dependence and FIX is statistically 
insignificant in all regressions. This result also holds when I divide the sample into 
developing and middles income countries. On the other hand, the interaction between 
the cash conversion cycle and FIX is statistically significant and positive in column 
(11), suggesting that output growth is higher for industries with high liquidity needs 
under fixed exchange rate regimes in middle income countries. While the coefficients 
of the interaction terms between the FIX dummy and the liquidity needs measures 
have the correct sign, they are not precisely estimated. Finally, the interaction effect 
between CCC and OTHER is negative but statistically insignificant in all 
specifications.   
Regression results for industry volatility are shown in Table 2.9. The dependent 
variable is the standard deviation of the growth rate of gross real output computed 
over 5-year periods for industries in the manufacturing sector. First, the freely falling 
category is associated with higher output volatility in all regressions. Second, the 
coefficient on FIX is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels in 
just one regression (column (9) for middle income countries). Finally, the interaction 




In the next set of regressions, I include openness of an industry as a regressor. Several 
studies (see, for example, Magud (2005, 2008) on the insulation properties of 
different exchange rate regimes) have emphasized the role that the degree of openness 
of an economy could have when choosing an exchange rate regime, especially in the 
presence of balance sheet effects.  
Currency mismatches are not uncommon in developing and middle income countries, 
and therefore, controlling for the degree of openness is important. Using industry-
level data from the manufacturing sector, I construct a measure of openness which is 
defined as the sum of exports and imports over gross output for each industry. Similar 
measures have been previously used in De Gregorio et al. (1994), Betts and Kehoe 
(2001), and Bems (2008) using annual data. Openness is averaged over 5-year periods 
and is country-industry-period specific.  
In many developing countries, firms are only able to borrow in foreign currency 
(Eichengreen and Hausman (1999)) and many suffer from liability dollarization. 
Industries in the manufacturing sector are likely to be affected in different degrees by 
this phenomenon. For instance, revenues for relatively open industries are in dollars 
(traded goods), and therefore, exchange rate arrangements should have a lesser 
impact on output growth. On the other hand, less open industries could benefit from 
exchange rate stability, experiencing higher growth and less volatility. Firms in such 
industries are likely to struggle to pay their dollar-denominated debts if the domestic 
currency experiences a large depreciation. Therefore, firms in relatively less open 
industries could experience more difficulty borrowing funds or find it more expensive 




or the lack of access to credit. Therefore, industries that are relatively less open are 
the ones that are likely to suffer currency mismatches. Also, industries that have 
higher liquidity needs will likely face more difficulties if debts are denominated in 
foreign currency. 
Table 2.10 presents the regression results including the openness variable as an 
additional regressor. Once we control for the degree of openness, we find that the 
coefficient on the interaction of FIX with the Cash Conversion Cycle is positive and 
statistically significant in all regressions, suggesting that industries with higher 




Table 2.11 presents the regression results for output volatility for developing and 
middle income countries. Columns (1) through (12) show that freely falling regimes 
are associated with higher levels of volatility. The coefficients on FIX, on the other 
hand, are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the choice between fixed and 
flexible exchange rate arrangements does not affect output volatility in the 
manufacturing sector for developing and middle income countries. The interaction 
terms between liquidity needs and FIX are also statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels.  
However, the coefficient on the openness variable is positive and statistically 
significant in all regressions. Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction term 
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between the fixed exchange rate arrangement dummies and openness are also 
negative and statistically significant, but about half the size in magnitude of the 
coefficient of the openness variable. This finding suggests that output volatility 
increases as the degree of openness increases under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
To summarize, this section explored the question of whether a given exchange rate 
arrangement has heterogeneous effects on industry growth and industry volatility that 
do not show up using aggregate data. This may not be surprising since a given 
exchange rate regime might affect an industry differently depending on industry 
characteristics such as liquidity needs and openness. The evidence presented here 
suggests that sectors with high liquidity needs, measured by Raddatz’s Cash 
Conversion Cycle, experience higher output growth under a fixed exchange rate 
system. This result is consistent with the preliminary findings in Table 2.6. However, 
I find little empirical support for the hypothesis that the choice between a fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regime is relevant for output volatility: industries with higher 
liquidity needs do not seem to exhibit lower output volatility under a peg. These 
findings are in line with the descriptive statistics presented earlier in the paper. 
 
2.6 Robustness Checks 
 
In this section I perform several robustness checks. First, I construct a currency crisis 
index à la Frankel and Rose (1996) using annual nominal exchange rate data from the 
International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund. The 




is also a substantial increase in the rate of change of nominal depreciation.” They use 
two criteria: a) a depreciation of the local currency of at least 25%, and b) the change 
in the exchange rate should exceed the previous year’s change by at least 10%.   
I include this currency crisis indicator in the regressions, because despite the fact that 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification controls for episodes of high inflation and 
currency crises, it is possible that some currency crisis episodes are classified as pegs 
or floats, thus affecting the results found in the previous section. If large currency 
depreciations represent episodes of economic turmoil and output contraction, then 
these episodes could potentially affect our results if most crises have been catalogued 
as floats by the de facto index. If that were the case, then crisis episodes, and not the 
exchange rate regime, would be the culprit for some of the differences across 
alternative regimes. I report only the regression results for output growth in Table 
2.12. 
Regression results depicted in Table 2.12 include the currency crisis dummy and the 
interaction terms between liquidity needs, the currency crisis dummies and the 
exchange rate regime dummies. As expected, the coefficients on currency crisis and 
on OTHER are negative and statistically significant in several of the regressions. The 
coefficients on the interaction between FIX and CCC remain positive, however, these 
are not precisely estimated in the dataset.  
Second, I run similar regressions using real value added rather than real gross output 
growth. Table 2.13 shows regression results analogous to those presented previously 
in Table 2.10. Value added and not gross output may prove to be a more appropriate 




expected, the coefficient on the interaction term between FIX and CCC is statistically 
significant in all regressions and has the correct sign. Moreover, the differential 
impact of fixed exchange rate regimes on industries with higher liquidity needs is 
more precisely estimated using real value added growth rather than real gross output 
growth as the dependent variable. Results in Table 2.13 confirm our findings using 
real value added growth. 
Finally, since industries that require relatively more external financing (as measured 
by the CCC index) seem to grow faster under exchange rate stability, I use the 
Institutional Investor Ratings (IIR) as a proxy for country risk. The idea is that a fixed 
exchange rate regime, by reducing country risk, could potentially lead to either 
additional funds being available through the domestic financial system, a reduction in 
the cost of financing, or both. Therefore, all else equal, industries that have high 
liquidity needs should benefit relatively more under these circumstances. Columns 
(1)-(3) and columns (7)-(9) in Table 2.14 show the regression results using real gross 
output growth, whereas columns (4)-(6) and columns (10)-(12) show the regression 
results using real value added growth. When Institutional Investor Ratings (IIR) are 
used as a proxy for country risk, I find that the interaction between IIR and CCC is 
positive and statistically significant in all regressions using both real gross output and 
value added growth. The coefficient on the interaction term between the fixed 
exchange rate regime dummy and CCC in the regressions with real growth output 
growth as the dependent variable remains positive but loses some precision. On the 
other hand, when real value added growth is used, the coefficient on the interaction 




is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. These findings are 
consistent with the idea of the potential benefit of a fixed exchange rate regime, 
which could lower currency risk, and therefore, result in lower interest rates and 
lower cost of capital for domestic firms in credit markets.  
 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, I have examined the effects of nominal exchange rate arrangements on 
industry-level output growth and volatility. My analysis suggests the following broad 
conclusions. 
First, industries that require relatively more external financing (as opposed to internal 
financing) than others seem to grow faster under exchange rate stability, although this 
is true only for developing countries and the Cash Conversion Cycle Index, which is 
mainly a measure of working capital needs. This result does not hold under Rajan and 
Zingales’ External Finance Dependence Index. One plausible explanation could be 
that a fixed exchange rate regime reduces currency or country risk, which could 
potentially translate into more funds being available through the domestic financial 
system or a reduction in the cost of financing. Therefore, all else equal, industries that 
have high liquidity needs should benefit relatively more under these circumstances.  
Developing countries suffer from liability dollarization. A more stable exchange rate 
regime would benefit those sectors that have to borrow more to finance investment 
projects, since loans in that case are mainly conducted in foreign currency or indexed 
to the exchange rate. A peg may help lower borrowing costs and increase the 




borrow more. This explanation is supported by the positive sign on the interaction of 
the Institutional Investors Rating and the Cash Conversion Cycle Index. This channel 
is likely to benefit industries that require higher working capital needs. Lower 
currency risk, and therefore, lower interest rates and cost of capital for domestic firms 
could be among some of the potential benefits of having a peg. Alternatively, 
industries that have higher liquidity needs are likely to face more difficulties if debts 
are denominated in foreign currency. All else equal, they would prefer more exchange 
rate stability, which may lower interest rates and provide easier access to credit. 
These explanations are consistent with the findings presented in this chapter. 
Second, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that fixed exchange rate 
regimes have little effect on volatility for industries that have relatively higher 
liquidity needs, and hence, I find little empirical support for the second hypothesis 
advanced in Section 2.3.  
I also find little support to the hypothesis that less open industries are also more likely 
to benefit from exchange rate stability. This may be the case for countries where 
liability dollarization is the norm, especially if loans are denominated in foreign 
currency. If the exchange rate is subject to large fluctuations, firms in these industries 
might experience difficulties servicing dollar-denominated debts, which they might 
have been able to repay at the previous exchange rate. Less open industries may 
therefore find it easier to borrow funds under a fixed exchange regime, potentially 
increasing their growth and reducing their volatility since they have easier access to 
credit. Many authors have emphasized the potential for pervasive balance sheet 




mention a few). As noted by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), emerging markets 
suffer from the “Original Sin” of being unable to issue debt denominated in domestic 
currency in international capital markets. I find little empirical support of this channel 
using this dataset. 
These results should be interpreted carefully. The data used in this paper is for the 
manufacturing sector only. Extending these conclusions to other sectors of the 
economy should be done with care. Moreover, my results suggest that nominal 
exchange rate arrangements might have heterogeneous effects on different industries 
of the economy, depending on the characteristics that each of these industries have. It 
is not surprising, however, that country-level regressions have found mixed results on 






























Industry All countries Developing Middle income All countries Developing Middle income
Food products 0.0306 0.0384 0.0385 0.1060 0.1452 0.1417
Beverages 0.0377 0.0422 0.0445 0.1425 0.1800 0.1754
Tobacco 0.0238 0.0258 0.0309 0.1686 0.1886 0.1898
Textiles 0.0003 0.0058 0.0073 0.1413 0.1620 0.1668
Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.0275 0.0618 0.0595 0.1779 0.2456 0.2251
Leather products 0.0109 0.0217 0.0167 0.2033 0.2520 0.2627
Footwear, except rubber or plastic -0.0060 0.0041 0.0051 0.1992 0.2656 0.2546
Wood products, except furniture 0.0235 0.0341 0.0360 0.2013 0.2514 0.2323
Furniture, except metal 0.0378 0.0473 0.0504 0.1920 0.2604 0.2463
Paper and products 0.0412 0.0519 0.0515 0.1588 0.1948 0.2008
Printing and publishing 0.0499 0.0577 0.0651 0.1575 0.2198 0.2123
Industrial chemicals 0.0413 0.0375 0.0550 0.2121 0.2593 0.2313
Other chemicals 0.0530 0.0534 0.0516 0.1437 0.1789 0.1785
Petroleum refineries 0.0513 0.0674 0.0571 0.2638 0.2963 0.2928
Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.0038 0.0055 -0.0022 0.3001 0.3834 0.4215
Rubber products 0.0164 0.0346 0.0215 0.1961 0.2570 0.2441
Plastic products 0.0623 0.0802 0.0801 0.1612 0.2081 0.1972
Pottery, china, earthenware 0.0406 0.0516 0.0617 0.2802 0.3510 0.3532
Glass and products 0.0380 0.0462 0.0490 0.1863 0.2168 0.2058
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.0357 0.0466 0.0471 0.1427 0.1743 0.1686
Iron and steel 0.0385 0.0677 0.0479 0.2041 0.2460 0.2387
Non-ferrous metals 0.0369 0.0558 0.0439 0.2270 0.2953 0.3027
Fabricated metal products 0.0339 0.0378 0.0384 0.1596 0.2130 0.2090
Machinery, except electrical 0.0551 0.0681 0.0604 0.2094 0.2647 0.2647
Machinery, electric 0.0449 0.0509 0.0492 0.1742 0.2142 0.2107
Transport equipment 0.0404 0.0459 0.0440 0.2123 0.2887 0.2960
Professional & scientific equipment 0.0606 0.0551 0.0503 0.2420 0.3430 0.3712
Other manufactured products 0.0281 0.0285 0.0394 0.2524 0.3277 0.3276
Real gross output growth Real gross output volatility
Average growth rate and volatility of real gross output by industry
Note: Output growth is the average growth rate across countries of real gross output for each industry in the manufacturing sector for 1974-
2003. Industry growth is the average growth rate over 5-year periods. Output volatility is the average volatility across countries of real gross
output for each industry in the manufacturing sector for 1974-2003. Industry volatility is the standard deviation of the growth rate of real gross
output over 5-year periods. The periods are 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. Industry-level data

























RR index Obs. Avg. growth Obs. Avg. growth Obs. Avg. growth
Fixed ER Regimes 4601 0.0422 2080 0.0640 1451 0.0617
Flexible ER Regimes 2110 0.0379 897 0.0541 778 0.0517
Difference FIX - FLEX 0.0043 0.0099 0.0100
P-value 0.1286 0.0533* 0.0910*
RR index Obs. Output vol. Obs. Output vol. Obs. Output vol.
Fixed ER Regimes 4601 0.1735 2080 0.2162 1451 0.2288
Flexible ER Regimes 2110 0.1590 897 0.2160 778 0.2173
Difference 0.0145 0.0002 0.0115
P-value 0.0072*** 0.9831 0.3299
Note: Output volatility is the average volatility of real gross output for each industry in the
manufacturing sector for 1974-2003. Industry volatility is the standard deviation of the growth rate of
real gross output over 5-year periods. The periods are 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-
1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. Industry-level data is from the UNIDO Indstat-3 2005 database
from the United Nations. Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes include pegs and crawling pegs, and
Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes include managed floats and floats. Regimes that are classified as
Freely Falling and regimes with no parallel market data are classified as OTHER. I use the
classification constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5
and 1 percent respectively for means equality tests.
Real gross output growth
Real output growth and volatility by exchange rate arrangements  (5-year averages)
All countries Developing Middle income
Note: Output growth is the average growth rate of real gross output for each industry in the
manufacturing sector over 5-year periods. Industry-level data is from the UNIDO Indstat-3 2005
database from the United Nations. Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes include pegs and crawling pegs,
and Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes include managed floats and floats. Regimes that are
classified as Freely Falling and regimes with no parallel market data are classified as OTHER. I use
the classification constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10,
5 and 1 percent respectively for means and medians equality tests.
Real gross output volatility
















ISIC Description External Finance Cash Conversion Cycle
311 Food products 0.137 0.495
313 Beverages 0.077 0.519
314 Tobacco -0.451 1.4
321 Textiles 0.277 1.058
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.029 1.231
323 Leather products -0.14 1.74
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic -0.078 1.328
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.284 0.742
332 Furniture, except metal 0.236 1.073
341 Paper and products 0.154 0.703
342 Printing and publishing 0.204 0.781
351 Industrial chemicals 0.236 0.914
352 Other chemicals 0.793 1.045
353 Petroleum refineries 0.042 0.19
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.334 0.687
355 Rubber products 0.226 0.926
356 Plastic products 1.14 0.844
361 Pottery, china, earthenware -0.146 1.232
362 Glass and products 0.528 0.961
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.062 1.018
371 Iron and steel 0.087 0.897
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.005 0.885
381 Fabricated metal products 0.237 1.116
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.724 1.457
383 Machinery, electric 0.846 1.46
384 Transport equipment 0.3 0.895
385 Professional & scientific equipment 0.961 1.673
390 Other manufactured products 0.47 1.416
Measures of Industry Liquidity Needs
























RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 2335 0.0482 2266 0.0361
FLEX 1063 0.0448 1047 0.0309
Difference 0.0034 0.0052
P-value 0.4069 0.1879
RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 1039 0.0679 1041 0.0602
FLEX 449 0.0585 448 0.0497
Difference 0.0094 0.0105
P-value 0.2185 0.1276
RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 718 0.0677 733 0.0558




External Finance Needs and Exchange Rate Arrangements - Output growth
Developing countries
Middle income countries
Note: Output growth is the average growth rate of real gross output for each industry 
in the manufacturing sector over 5-year periods. Industry-level data is from the
UNIDO Indstat-3 2005 database from the United Nations. Rajan and Zingales
(1998) External Finance Needs is industry-specific. High External Finance Needs
industries are industries above the manufacturing sector median according to the
Rajan and Zingales measure. Low External Finance Needs industries are
industries below the median. Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes include pegs and
crawling pegs, and Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes include managed floats and
floats. Regimes that are classified as Freely Falling and regimes with no parallel
market data are classified as OTHER. I use the classification constructed by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent
respectively for means equality tests.
High External Finance Needs Low External Finance Needs
High External Finance Needs Low External Finance Needs




















RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 2335 0.1810 2266 0.1659
FLEX 1063 0.1628 1047 0.1552
Difference 0.0182 0.0107
P-value 0.0261** 0.1283
RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 1039 0.2294 1041 0.2031
FLEX 449 0.2261 448 0.2059
Difference 0.0033 -0.0028
P-value 0.8301 0.8181
RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 718 0.2425 733 0.2153
FLEX 391 0.2282 387 0.2063
Difference 0.0144 0.0090
P-value 0.4403 0.5342
External Finance Needs and Exchange Rate Arrangements - Output volatility
All countries
High External Finance Needs Low External Finance Needs
Developing countries
Middle income countries
Note: Output volatility is the average volatility of real gross output for each industry in
the manufacturing sector for 1974-2003. Industry volatility is the standard deviation
of the growth rate of real gross output over 5-year periods. The periods are 1974-
1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. Industry-
level data is from the UNIDO Indstat-3 2005 database from the United Nations.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) External Finance Needs is industry-specific. High
External Finance Needs industries are industries above the manufacturing sector
median according to the Rajan and Zingales measure. Low External Finance
Needs industries are industries below the median. Industry-level data is from the
UNIDO Indstat-3 2005 database from the United Nations. Fixed Exchange Rate
Regimes include pegs and crawling pegs, and Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes
include managed floats and floats. Regimes that are classified as Freely Falling
and regimes with no parallel market data are classified as OTHER. I use the
classification constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). *, **, and *** denote
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively for means equality tests.
High External Finance Needs Low External Finance Needs

















RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 2326 0.0423 2275 0.0421
FLEX 1081 0.0354 1029 0.0406
Difference 0.0070 0.0015
P-value 0.0954* 0.6906
RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 1061 0.0662 1019 0.0617
FLEX 452 0.0463 445 0.0620
Difference 0.0200 -0.0003
P-value 0.0073*** 0.9665
RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 736 0.0650 715 0.0583
FLEX 391 0.0454 387 0.0580
Difference 0.0195 0.0004
P-value 0.0246** 0.9633




Note: Output growth is the average growth rate of real gross output for each industry 
in the manufacturing sector over 5-year periods. Industry-level data is from the
UNIDO Indstat-3 2005 database from the United Nations. Raddatz (2006) Cash
Conversion Cycle (CCC) is industry-specific. High Cash Conversion Cycle
industries are industries above the manufacturing sector median according to
Raddatz's measure. Low Cash Conversion Cycle industries are industries below
the median. Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes include pegs and crawling pegs, and
Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes include managed floats and floats. Regimes that
are classified as Freely Falling and regimes with no parallel market data are
classified as OTHER. I use the classification constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff
(2004). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively for
means equality tests.
High Cash Conversion Cycle Low Cash Conversion Cycle
High Cash Conversion Cycle Low Cash Conversion Cycle



















RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 2326 0.1746 2275 0.1724
FLEX 1081 0.1614 1029 0.1565
Difference 0.0132 0.0159
P-value 0.0948* 0.0298**
RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 1061 0.2211 1019 0.2112
FLEX 452 0.2214 445 0.2106
Difference -0.0003 0.0006
P-value 0.9841 0.9645
RR index Obs Mean Obs Mean
FIX 736 0.2329 715 0.2245




High Cash Conversion Cycle Low Cash Conversion Cycle
Note: Output volatility is the average volatility of real gross output for each industry in
the manufacturing sector for 1974-2003. Industry volatility is the standard deviation
of the growth rate of real gross output over 5-year periods. The periods are 1974-
1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. Industry-
level data is from the UNIDO Indstat-3 2005 database from the United Nations.
Raddatz (2006) Cash Conversion Cycle is industry-specific. High Cash Conversion
Cycle (CCC) industries are industries above the manufacturing sector median
according to Raddatz's measure. Low Cash Conversion Cycle industries are
industries below the median. Industry-level data is from the UNIDO Indstat-3 2005
database from the United Nations. Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes include pegs
and crawling pegs, and Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes include managed floats
and floats. Regimes that are classified as Freely Falling and regimes with no
parallel market data are classified as OTHER. I use the classification constructed
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). I use the classification constructed by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004). *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively
for means equality tests.
Cash Conversion Cycle and Exchange Rate Arrangements -Output volatility
All countries
High Cash Conversion Cycle Low Cash Conversion Cycle
Developing countries
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FIX 0.0081 0.0053 -0.0150 -0.0161 0.0198** 0.0139 -0.0266 -0.0292 0.0248*** 0.0162* -0.0255 -0.0296
(0.0052) (0.0060) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0288) (0.0293) (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0301) (0.0306)
OTHER -0.0588*** -0.0534*** -0.0174 -0.0149 -0.0423*** -0.0392*** -0.0238 -0.0221 -0.0355*** -0.0340*** -0.0100 -0.0093
(0.0092) (0.0109) (0.0323) (0.0330) (0.0114) (0.0132) (0.0405) (0.0414) (0.0108) (0.0129) (0.0453) (0.0463)
FIX x Ext. Fin. 0.0103 0.0076 0.0214 0.0166 0.0314 0.0266
(0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0189) (0.0180) (0.0203) (0.0190)
OTHER x Ext. Fin. -0.0198 -0.0159 -0.0116 -0.0101 -0.0059 -0.0034
(0.0228) (0.0224) (0.0285) (0.0278) (0.0305) (0.0294)
FIX x CCC 0.0224 0.0215 0.0448 0.0428 0.0486* 0.0454
(0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0294) (0.0289)
OTHER x CCC -0.0399 -0.0382 -0.0181 -0.0171 -0.0250 -0.0249
(0.0289) (0.0284) (0.0367) (0.0362) (0.0417) (0.0410)
Constant 0.0601*** 0.0600*** 0.0601*** 0.0601*** 0.0770*** 0.0771*** 0.0772*** 0.0773*** 0.0658*** 0.0660*** 0.0662*** 0.0663***
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0082)
Period x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7935 7935 7935 7935 4117 4117 4117 4117 3156 3156 3156 3156
Adj. R sq. 0.122 0.122 0.123 0.123 0.104 0.104 0.106 0.105 0.108 0.108 0.101 0.101
Liquidity needs and output growth
All countries Developing countries Middle income countries
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gross output of an industry in a given country and period. Industry growth is the average growth rate of
real gross output over 5-year periods. The periods are 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. Industry-level data is from
the UNIDO Indstat-3 2005 database from the United Nations. External Finance and Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) are industry-specific. FIX include pegs and
crawling pegs, and OTHER include freely falling and regimes with no parallel market data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification. Columns (1)-(4)
show the results for all countries. Columns (5)-(8) show the results for developing countries. Columns (9)-(12) show the results for middle income countries.
Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FIX -0.0076 -0.0013 -0.0027 0.0002 -0.0166 -0.0086 0.0076 0.0115 -0.0336** -0.0286 -0.0006 0.0013
(0.0090) (0.0121) (0.0262) (0.0259) (0.0149) (0.0199) (0.0421) (0.0416) (0.0168) (0.0221) (0.0486) (0.0484)
OTHER 0.0940*** 0.1033*** 0.1238*** 0.1283*** 0.0892*** 0.1006*** 0.1257*** 0.1314*** 0.0716*** 0.0814*** 0.1109** 0.1155***
(0.0126) (0.0167) (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0153) (0.0208) (0.0426) (0.0428) (0.0144) (0.0188) (0.0436) (0.0442)
FIX x Ext. Fin. -0.0225 -0.0222 -0.0288 -0.0263 -0.0177 -0.0139
(0.0260) (0.0268) (0.0424) (0.0437) (0.0504) (0.0515)
OTHER x Ext. Fin. -0.0337 -0.0309 -0.0418 -0.0382 -0.0359 -0.0314
(0.0333) (0.0337) (0.0429) (0.0436) (0.0443) (0.0442)
FIX x CCC -0.0048 -0.0016 -0.0236 -0.0202 -0.0319 -0.0300
(0.0266) (0.0274) (0.0438) (0.0451) (0.0511) (0.0522)
OTHER x CCC -0.0289 -0.0249 -0.0355 -0.0309 -0.0383 -0.0343
(0.0342) (0.0348) (0.0426) (0.0434) (0.0438) (0.0440)
Constant 0.1808*** 0.1807*** 0.1808*** 0.1807*** 0.2123*** 0.2122*** 0.2124*** 0.2122*** 0.2194*** 0.2193*** 0.2194*** 0.2193***
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150)
Period x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7935 7935 7935 7935 4117 4117 4117 4117 3156 3156 3156 3156
Adj. R sq. 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.280 0.280 0.280 0.280 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.248
Liquidity needs and output volatility
All countries Developing countries Middle income countries
Note: The dependent variable is the volatility of real gross output for each industry in the manufacturing sector for 1974-2003. Industry volatility is the standard
deviation of the growth rate of real gross output over 5-year periods. The periods are 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-
2003. Industry-level data is from the UNIDO Indstat-3 2005 database from the United Nations. External Finance and Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) are industry-
specific. FIX include pegs and crawling pegs, and OTHER include freely falling and regimes with no parallel market data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
classification. Columns (1)-(4) show the results for all countries. Columns (5)-(8) show the results for developing countries. Columns (9)-(12) show the results
for middle income countries. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FIX 0.0329*** -0.0305 -0.0342 0.0347*** -0.0291 -0.0345
(0.0111) (0.0315) (0.0322) (0.0118) (0.0340) (0.0346)
OTHER -0.0417*** -0.0318 -0.0325 -0.0597*** -0.0258 -0.0265
(0.0129) (0.0347) (0.0351) (0.0142) (0.0377) (0.0382)
Openness 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0054)
FIX x Openness 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0055)
OTHER x Openness -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0013 0.0014 0.0012
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0054)
FIX x Ext. Fin. 0.0321 0.0248 0.0431* 0.0360
(0.0240) (0.0230) (0.0252) (0.0238)
OTHER x Ext. Fin. 0.0018 0.0039 -0.0024 0.0034
(0.0295) (0.0293) (0.0299) (0.0296)
FIX x CCC 0.0698** 0.0670** 0.0729** 0.0689**
(0.0310) (0.0304) (0.0338) (0.0330)
OTHER x CCC -0.0092 -0.0094 -0.0340 -0.0340
(0.0332) (0.0330) (0.0369) (0.0367)
Constant 0.0483*** 0.0482*** 0.0480*** 0.0234** 0.0234** 0.0231**
(0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0115)
Period x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3393 3393 3393 2579 2579 2579
Adj. R sq. 0.381 0.383 0.383 0.187 0.192 0.192
Industry openness, liquidity needs and output growth
Developing countries Middle income countries
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gross output of an industry in a given country
and period. Industry growth is the average growth rate of real gross output over 5-year periods.
Openness is defined as average of the ratio of (exports + imports)/real gross output over 5-year
periods and is country-industry-period specific. The periods are 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988,
1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. External Finance and Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) are
industry-specific. FIX include pegs and crawling pegs, and OTHER include freely falling and regimes
with no parallel market data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification. Columns (1)-(3) show the 
results for developing countries. Columns (4)-(6) show the results for middle income countries.
Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FIX -0.0168 0.0220 0.0227 -0.0293 0.0203 0.0206
(0.0187) (0.0420) (0.0423) (0.0213) (0.0498) (0.0503)
OTHER 0.0843*** 0.1232*** 0.1191*** 0.1027*** 0.1312*** 0.1320**
(0.0189) (0.0457) (0.0461) (0.0215) (0.0507) (0.0513)
Openness 0.0112*** 0.0110*** 0.0111*** 0.0107*** 0.0106*** 0.0106***
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0024)
FIX x Openness -0.0053** -0.0051** -0.0051** -0.0051** -0.0049** -0.0049**
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022)
OTHER x Openness -0.0075*** -0.0073*** -0.0073*** -0.0112*** -0.0110*** -0.0110***
(0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025)
FIX x Ext. Fin. -0.0083 -0.0040 -0.0076 -0.0021
(0.0414) (0.0420) (0.0482) (0.0486)
OTHER x Ext. Fin. 0.0269 0.0311 -0.0104 -0.0066
(0.0413) (0.0417) (0.0471) (0.0478)
FIX x CCC -0.0401 -0.0397 -0.0503 -0.0500
(0.0431) (0.0436) (0.0507) (0.0513)
OTHER x CCC -0.0309 -0.0352 -0.0307 -0.0297
(0.0442) (0.0447) (0.0494) (0.0501)
Constant 0.2245*** 0.2247*** 0.2247*** 0.2498*** 0.2501*** 0.2501***
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Period x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3393 3393 3393 2579 2579 2579
Adj. R sq. 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.429 0.430 0.429
Industry tradability, liquidity needs and output volatility
Developing countries Middle income countries
Note: The dependent variable is the volatility of real gross output for each industry in the
manufacturing sector for 1974-2003. Industry volatility is the standard deviation of the growth rate of
real gross output over 5-year periods. Openness is defined as average of the ratio of (exports +
imports)/real gross output over 5-year periods and is country-industry-period specific. The periods are 
1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. External Finance and
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) are industry-specific. FIX include pegs and crawling pegs, and OTHER 
include freely falling and regimes with no parallel market data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
classification. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for developing countries. Columns (4)-(6) show the
results for middle income countries. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FIX 0.0052 0.0027 -0.0138 -0.0147 0.0165* 0.0107 -0.0261 -0.0286 0.0197** 0.0106 -0.0231 -0.0275
(0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0089) (0.0100) (0.0293) (0.0298) (0.0092) (0.0102) (0.0308) (0.0313)
OTHER -0.0536*** -0.0490*** -0.0194 -0.0171 -0.0392*** -0.0362*** -0.0243 -0.0226 -0.0325*** -0.0309** -0.0115 -0.0107
(0.0093) (0.0111) (0.0328) (0.0336) (0.0115) (0.0134) (0.0407) (0.0415) (0.0106) (0.0127) (0.0452) (0.0461)
CRISIS -0.0157*** -0.0135** 0.0061 0.0069 -0.0132** -0.0128 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0171** -0.0184** 0.0088 0.0078
(0.0052) (0.0062) (0.0154) (0.0157) (0.0066) (0.0078) (0.0191) (0.0196) (0.0075) (0.0091) (0.0224) (0.0231)
CRISIS x Ext. Fin. -0.0081 -0.0056 -0.0018 0.0001 0.0044 0.0076
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0205) (0.0201)
CRISIS x CCC -0.0212 -0.0205 -0.0154 -0.0154 -0.0253 -0.0264
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0224) (0.0220)
FIX x Ext. Fin. 0.0090 0.0068 0.0211 0.0167 0.0331 0.0291
(0.0126) (0.0122) (0.0200) (0.0190) (0.0218) (0.0203)
OTHER x Ext. Fin. -0.0168 -0.0139 -0.0112 -0.0102 -0.0065 -0.0049
(0.0235) (0.0231) (0.0289) (0.0283) (0.0296) (0.0286)
FIX x CCC 0.0184 0.0175 0.0411 0.0391 0.0413 0.0378
(0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0283) (0.0278) (0.0308) (0.0300)
OTHER x CCC -0.0330 -0.0315 -0.0145 -0.0135 -0.0205 -0.0201
(0.0293) (0.0289) (0.0366) (0.0362) (0.0414) (0.0408)
Constant 0.0645*** 0.0645*** 0.0646*** 0.0646*** 0.0814*** 0.0814*** 0.0816*** 0.0816*** 0.0725*** 0.0726*** 0.0728*** 0.0729***
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Period x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7935 7935 7935 7935 4117 4117 4117 4117 3156 3156 3156 3156
Adj. R sq. 0.123 0.123 0.125 0.124 0.105 0.105 0.106 0.106 (0.120) (0.121) (0.118) (0.119)
Currency crisis, liquidity needs and output growth
All countries Developing countries Middle income countries
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gross output of an industry in a given country and period. Industry growth is the average growth rate of
real gross output over 5-year periods. The periods are 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. Industry-level data is from
the UNIDO Indstat-3 2005 database from the United Nations. External Finance and Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) are industry-specific. FIX include pegs and
crawling pegs, and OTHER include freely falling and regimes with no parallel market data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification. CRISIS is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if there a currency crisis has occured in a given country over 5-year time period, 0 otherwise. Time periods are the same as
indicated above. Columns (1)-(4) show the results for all countries. Columns (5)-(8) show the results for developing countries. Columns (9)-(12) show the
results for middle income countries. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and ***


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FIX 0.0330** -0.0531 -0.0533 0.0278* -0.0695 -0.0707
(0.0152) (0.0412) (0.0406) (0.0164) (0.0450) (0.0443)
OTHER -0.0491** -0.0590 -0.0613 -0.0738*** -0.0671 -0.0720
(0.0203) (0.0450) (0.0455) (0.0234) (0.0474) (0.0476)
Openness -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0050)
FIX x Openness 0.0014 0.0011 0.0011 0.0016 0.0014 0.0014
(0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0050)
OTHER x Openness -0.0042 -0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0041 -0.0033 -0.0036
(0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0053) (0.0053)
FIX x Ext. Fin. 0.0112 0.0012 0.0204 0.0094
(0.0279) (0.0287) (0.0303) (0.0310)
OTHER x Ext. Fin. 0.0173 0.0154 0.0356 0.0347
(0.0384) (0.0390) (0.0447) (0.0461)
FIX x CCC 0.0869** 0.0867** 0.1002** 0.0988**
(0.0408) (0.0419) (0.0450) (0.0463)
OTHER x CCC 0.0137 0.0121 0.0019 -0.0020
(0.0426) (0.0432) (0.0464) (0.0474)
Constant 0.0842*** 0.0807*** 0.0815*** 0.0510*** 0.0503*** 0.0503***
(0.0168) (0.0164) (0.0167) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0121)
Period x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3675 3675 3675 2791 2791 2791
Adj. R sq. 0.185 0.189 0.188 0.049 0.056 0.055
Industry openness, liquidity needs and value added growth
Developing countries Middle income countries
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real value added of an industry in a given country
and period. Industry growth is the average growth rate of real value added over 5-year periods.
Openness is defined as average of the ratio of (exports + imports)/real gross output over 5-year
periods and is country-industry-period specific. The periods are 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988,
1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. External Finance and Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) are
industry-specific. FIX include pegs and crawling pegs, and OTHER include freely falling and regimes
with no parallel market data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification. Columns (1)-(3) show the 
results for developing countries. Columns (4)-(6) show the results for middle income countries.
Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FIX 0.0102 -0.0293 -0.0331 0.0082 -0.0788* -0.0805** 0.0087 -0.0281 -0.0323 0.0079 -0.0857* -0.0871*
(0.0102) (0.0293) (0.0298) (0.0151) (0.0407) (0.0399) (0.0115) (0.0335) (0.0338) (0.0170) (0.0455) (0.0445)
OTHER -0.0574*** -0.0688** -0.0692** -0.0578*** -0.0985** -0.1020** -0.0643*** -0.0739** -0.0770** -0.0709*** -0.0989** -0.1073**
(0.0123) (0.0344) (0.0350) (0.0192) (0.0422) (0.0425) (0.0138) (0.0370) (0.0377) (0.0209) (0.0443) (0.0448)
IIR 0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0017 0.0020** -0.0014 -0.0012 0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0027 0.0019** -0.0013 -0.0014
(0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0017)
IIR x Ext. Fin 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0012 0.0025 0.0018 0.0005 0.0001
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0016)
IIR x CCC 0.0029* 0.0029* 0.0031** 0.0033** 0.0042** 0.0040** 0.0033** 0.0033**
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0016)
FIX x Ext. Fin. 0.0309 0.0266 0.0256 0.0147 0.0289 0.0258 0.0240 0.0130
(0.0222) (0.0211) (0.0280) (0.0295) (0.0247) (0.0234) (0.0313) (0.0331)
OTHER x Ext. Fin. 0.0062 0.0048 0.0307 0.0243 0.0242 0.0220 0.0601 0.0538
(0.0281) (0.0272) (0.0395) (0.0399) (0.0322) (0.0306) (0.0440) (0.0442)
FIX x CCC 0.0461 0.0427 0.0907** 0.0887** 0.0428 0.0399 0.0969** 0.0947**
(0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0408) (0.0424) (0.0345) (0.0338) (0.0461) (0.0480)
OTHER x CCC 0.0124 0.0114 0.0472 0.0444 0.0159 0.0127 0.0424 0.0369
(0.0327) (0.0322) (0.0412) (0.0420) (0.0364) (0.0356) (0.0443) (0.0449)
Constant 0.0436 0.0453* 0.0452* 0.0235 0.0189 0.0246 0.0209 0.0220 0.0302 -0.0021 0.0154 0.0142
(0.0267) (0.0265) (0.0266) (0.0213) (0.0222) (0.0213) (0.0258) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0210) (0.0194) (0.0196)
Period x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3043 3043 3043 3485 3485 3485 2379 2379 2379 2706 2706 2706
Adj. R sq. 0.177 0.181 0.180 0.110 0.116 0.116 0.052 0.058 0.057 0.05 0.052 0.056
Institutional Investor Rating, liquidity needs and output/value added growth
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real gross output (value added) of an industry in a given country and period. Industry growth is the average
growth rate of real gross output (value added) over 5-year periods. IIR is the Institutional Investor Rating averaged over 5-year periods and is country-industry-
period specific. The periods are 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. External Finance and Cash Conversion Cycle
(CCC) are industry-specific. FIX include pegs and crawling pegs, and OTHER include freely falling and regimes with no parallel market data from Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004) classification. Columns (1)-(6) show the results for developing countries. Columns (7)-(12) show the results for middle income countries. In
columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9), the dependent variable in the real gross output growth. In columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(11) the dependent variable is the real value
added growth. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at
10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.














Currency crises have been recurrent phenomena in developing countries. Many of 
these crises were confined just to the borders of the originating country, such was the 
case when Argentina abandoned its currency board and defaulted on its sovereign 
debt in 2002. In other cases, crises spilled over to other countries. This was the case 
during the Tequila Peso Crisis of 1994-1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997. The 
devaluation of the Baht in 1997 was not only bound to the Thai economy, but also 
had economic consequences for other countries in the region. Many of them also 
experienced collapses in their currencies and significant output contractions. 
Around the Tequila and the East Asian Crises, a large empirical literature emerged 
focusing on underlying factors behind currency crisis episodes and ways to better 
predict their occurrence. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and Frankel and 
Rose (1996), for instance, examine the behavior of macroeconomic and institutional 
variables around the time of a currency crisis to establish which of these factors may 
be useful to predict the occurrence of these events. Other studies, such as Kaminsky, 





Most of these empirical studies rely on theoretical models of currency crisis to narrow 
down the selection of potential explanatory variables that could help predict the 
occurrence of a crisis.  Early theoretical models such as Krugman (1979) and Flood 
and Garber (1984) have identified deteriorating economic fundamentals as the main 
culprit of currency crisis episodes. In Krugman’s model, the government’s persistent 
fiscal deficit is financed by the central bank, which gradually drains its international 
reserves until a perfect foresight speculative attack to the fixed exchange regime rate 
takes place. Other studies, such as Obstfeld (1994, 1996), explore the possibility of 
trade-offs among alternative government objectives and the decision of whether to 
abandon or defend the fixed exchange rate regime. Later models emphasized the 
possibility of multiple equilibria, self-fulfilling expectations, and potential contagion 
effects (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), MacKinnon and Pill (1997)). Berg 
and Patillo (1999) analyze the out-of-sample performance and the ability to predict 
the vicinity of a crisis of several of these empirical models, finding mixed results. 
This chapter provides yet another contribution to the existing literature of currency 
crises
7
. This paper investigates the role played by different exchange rate 
arrangements in output performance around a currency crisis episode. In other words, 
I explore whether output responses differ across large devaluations and depreciations. 
First, I define a currency crisis episode using a similar methodology as in Frankel and 
Rose (1996). More specifically, a currency crisis takes place when the nominal 
exchange rate experiences a 15% increase. Then I proceed to classify crisis episodes 
into devaluations and depreciations using the natural exchange rate classification by 
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Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Once these episodes are sorted out, I analyze the 
behavior of output across them.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a brief review of the literature. 
Section 3.3 discusses data sources, the construction of both depreciation and 
devaluation indicators, descriptive statistics, and the methodology. Regression results 
are reported in section 3.4. Section 3.5 performs several robustness checks. Section 
3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Related Literature 
 
The traditional textbook expenditure-switching effect suggests that large devaluations 
(depreciations) can be expansionary. A nominal devaluation (depreciation) would 
translate into a real devaluation (depreciation) in the short-run under wage and price 
stickiness, stimulating exports and discouraging imports, and increasing employment 
and output. Therefore, if expenditure-switching is the main acting mechanism, a 
nominal devaluation (depreciation) is likely to lead to increased production in traded 
goods, higher net exports, and an improvement of the external position of the country 
in question. 
However, under certain circumstances, depreciations and devaluations can be costly 
in terms of output. A sharp increase in the exchange rate could have contractionary 
effects, working through channels such as wealth effects on aggregate demand, higher 
costs of imported inputs, a rise in the external debt burden from a devaluation 




markets and capital inflows which might limit the possibility of importing capital 
goods used in production.  
Lizondo and Montiel (1989) present a general framework to explore a variety of 
channels through which a nominal depreciation or devaluation could affect real 
economic activity. On the demand side, a real devaluation (depreciation) is likely to 
affect the real economy though the following: i) by changes in the relative price of 
traded goods and the demand for non-traded goods due to substitution effects, ii) by 
generating real income effects, which will depend on the trade balance at the time of 
the devaluation (depreciation), iii) by changing the income distribution of the 
economy, either from sectors that have a high propensity to spend to sectors with 
lower propensity to spend on non-traded goods, from the private to the public sector 
through changes in the real tax burden, and across owners of different type of assets 
as it causes changes in the real value of existing wealth, and vi) by altering 
investment decisions in the non-traded sectors if a substantial share of investment is 
composed of imported capital goods.  
On the supply side, a devaluation (depreciation) is likely to work through various 
channels: i) through its effect on the production cost of domestically produced goods 
expressed in domestic currency, and hence on the supply of those goods ii) through 
its effect on the price of imported inputs, especially in non-traded sectors –the output 
effect will depend on the elasticity of substitution between labor and imported inputs, 
iii) through post-devaluation (depreciation) increases in nominal wages, which could 




financing costs for working capital following a devaluation (depreciation) episode 
and its negative effect on economic activity in non-traded sectors. 
Early studies that focused on the output effects of currency crises such as Cooper 
(1971) and Krueger (1979) find that devaluations were associated with output 
contractions, although these effects were relatively small. Morley (1992) analyzes the 
effects of devaluations during stabilization programs in 28 developing countries for 
the period beginning in 1974. He finds that a ten percentage point increase in the real 
exchange rate was associated with a one percentage point decline in the rate of 
capacity utilization two years following the devaluation. A comparison of the 
devaluation episodes across the Cooper and Morley studies suggests that later 
episodes were on average more contractionary than earlier ones. According to Morley 
(1992), these differences are explained by the fact that in the 1960s devaluations were 
undertaken in the context of trade liberalization and government efforts to correct 
distortions in the foreign trade sector (reduction of tariffs and elimination of multiple 
exchange rates), whereas devaluations after 1974 were generally associated with 
balance of payments crises. 
Edwards (1986) also evaluates the contractionary devaluation hypothesis using data 
on 12 developing countries for 1965-1980. He finds that devaluations have been 
associated on average with declines in aggregate real output during the first year, but 
this effect is reversed in the second year, suggesting that devaluations have no effects 
on the medium-run.  
More recent studies find that currency crises are generally associated with output 




and balance of payments crises in emerging markets using data for the period 1975-
1997 that includes 32 emerging market economies and 78 crisis episodes. They find 
that these episodes are associated with a cumulative output drop of 5 to 8 percent over 
a two-year period, even after controlling for country-specific factors, and external and 
policy variables. Finally, Gupta et al. (2007) also examine the behavior of output 
during currency crises for the period 1970-2000 in 91 developing countries spanning 
195 crisis episodes. They find that even though the majority of the currency crises 
have been contractionary, 40 percent of crises have had an expansionary effect on 
output. They also report that countries that were less open to trade, that had large 
capital inflows, and that had more open capital accounts were more likely to suffer a 
contraction in economy activity.  
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
 
In order to study the response in output across large devaluations and depreciations, 
first it is necessary to construct an indicator of currency crises. Previous studies have 
either used an index of exchange rate pressure or just tracked changes in the nominal 
exchange rate to identify crisis episodes.  
The former method identifies currency crises as occurring when the index of 
exchange rate pressure exceeds a given threshold. This index is computed using 
changes in the exchange rate, changes in international reserves, and in some cases, 
changes in the interest rate (see for example, Eichengreen et al. (1995), Goldstein, 




and Reinhart (1998)). The rationale behind the inclusion of interest rates or reserve 
losses in the construction of the index is that a speculative attack on the currency 
might force the monetary authority to defend the currency by using its international 
reserves or through hikes in domestic interest rates. One problem that could arise with 
this type of index is that in some cases international reserves data is not readily 
available. An additional concern is that in some occasions changes in interest rates do 
not convey relevant information due to government controls on the financial system.  
The latter method defines currency crisis episodes as occurring when the nominal 
exchange rate crosses a given threshold. Edwards (1986) and Morley (1992), for 
example, define a devaluation episode when the exchange rate increases by 15 
percent. In Frankel and Rose (1996), a currency crisis requires two conditions: i) a 
depreciation of the currency of at least 25 percent, and ii) at least a 10 percent 
increase in the rate of depreciation. In this paper, a currency crisis is said to occur 
when the exchange rate (expressed as domestic currency per unit of reference or base 
currency) experiences an increase of at least 15 percent during the course of a year.
8,9
 
I adopt this lower threshold because Frankel and Rose’s threshold may prove to be 
too high and as a result it will fail to capture depreciations and devaluations episodes 
in periods of low inflation
10
. My results, however, also hold using Frankel and Rose’s 
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 This is computed with respect to the reference or base currency for a given country.  
9
 A comparison between the currency crisis episodes identified here and the ones identified in other 
studies using the index of exchange rate pressure are positively correlated and show a significant 
degree of overlap. 
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higher threshold. In this case, understandably so, the number of episodes is reduced 
significantly from 240 to 131 given the higher threshold imposed.    
The next step is to sort these episodes into devaluations and depreciations. I use the 
de facto exchange rate classification given by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, RR 
hereafter) and the detailed country chronologies provided in their paper to determine 
whether or not a currency crisis was associated with a peg or semi-peg regime.
11
 
Thus, a devaluation episode is defined as a currency crisis in which the country was 
running a peg or semi-peg regime prior to the crisis according to RR classification. 
Similarly, a large depreciation is defined as a crisis episode in which the country was 
running a float or semi-float exchange rate regime. 
Country-level data such as real output, financial and external variables were obtained 
from different sources, mainly from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the 
World Bank. In Table 3.B, I list the years and countries that have experienced a 
currency crisis episode, classifying them into devaluation and depreciation episodes 
according to RR. For the period 1970-2007, I identify 240 currency crises, with 138 
of them occurring under a peg or semi-peg system. 58 of those large depreciations 
and devaluations were recorded in industrial countries, whereas 182 of them took 
place in developing countries. 
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Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics on currency crisis, devaluation, and 
depreciation episodes and the average change in output growth. The change in output 
growth is defined as the difference between the average real output growth for the 
two years preceding currency crisis episode and the average real output growth for 
the concurrent and posterior year of the crisis episode. Similar measures have been 
used in other studies (see, for example, Gupta et al. (2007)). The idea behind this 
approach is to compare “turbulent” periods to “tranquil” ones. Taking the average of 
two pre-crisis years and two post-crisis years helps avoid potential problems related 
to the timing of the currency crisis episode, which in some cases might have occurred 
late in the year. For the same reasons, I also include in next section's regression 
analysis an additional dummy variable to measure the output effect in the year 
following each crisis episode.  
Out of these 240 episodes, about fifty-four percent of them were associated with 
negative output performances. The average growth effect across all currency crisis 
episodes is -1%. While depreciations seem to lead to slightly larger output losses than 
devaluations, the difference is small and statistically insignificant. For industrial 
countries, the average change in growth across currency crisis episodes is negligible 
(-0.015%). While depreciation episodes appear to be slightly more contractionary 
than devaluations, they are associated on average with very mild output losses (-
0.4%). 
Currency crisis episodes have been associated with much larger output losses for the 
sample of developing countries. Economic activity fell in fifty-five percent of these 




A quick comparison across devaluation and depreciation episodes in this sub-sample 
suggests that the proportion of episodes linked with negative changes in growth is 
about the same. As shown in Table 3.1, the average change in growth is very similar 
across these episodes. A simple means test indicates that changes in growth are not 
statistically different across devaluations and depreciations. 
Finally, I disaggregate the sample into middle income countries
12
 and developing 
non-middle income countries (hereafter, non-middle income countries). This 
distinction is interesting because middle income countries are in general more open to 
international credit markets than low income countries and also receive a larger 
proportion of portfolio inflows (Hutchinson and Noy (2002)). This makes them more 
vulnerable to capital flow reversals, sudden stops and sharp devaluations 
(depreciations) of their nominal exchange rate. Aghion et al. (2006) argue that 
economies at the intermediate stage of financial development comprise the more 
interesting group as the liberalization of the capital account is more likely to put 
macroeconomic stability in jeopardy.  
For middle income countries, currency crises have been associated with significantly 
larger output losses (the change in output growth is about -1.8%). The proportion of 
episodes with negative changes in growth is about the same as in developing 
countries (roughly fifty-eight percent). Moreover, output contractions during 
devaluation episodes are on average more costly (the average change in growth is -
2.5%), with approximately fifty-nine percent of all such episodes associated with a 
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decline in output growth. On the other hand, the slowdown in growth during 
depreciation episodes has been smaller on average (close to -1.1%). For non-middle 
income countries, the change in growth is around -0.4% across crisis episodes, with 
devaluations being mildly expansionary (average change in growth of about 0.5% and 
fifty-six percent of the episodes being associated with increases in growth) and 
depreciations being contractionary (average decline in growth of about 1.6%, with 
only thirty-nine percent of such episodes associated with increases in growth).  
Figure 3.1 shows the frequency distribution of the change in output growth across 
different episodes. Panels 1.a to 1.c present the impact on output growth of currency 
crises, devaluations, and depreciations episodes for developing countries respectively. 
The frequency distributions suggest that there is not much discrepancy between large 
depreciations and large devaluations in terms of their impact on growth. The impact 
of currency crisis episodes for middle income countries is depicted in Panels 2.a to 
2.c. While the impact of currency crisis and depreciation episodes on output growth 
seem to be more evenly distributed, the panels also suggest that devaluation episodes 
are more likely to be associated with weaker output performances than depreciation 
episodes. Finally, panels 3.a to 3.c show that this regularity is somehow reversed for 
non-middle income countries. Depreciation episodes appear to be more 
contractionary than devaluation episodes for non-middle income countries. We 






3.4 Regression Results 
 
I use regression analysis to complement the univariate event analysis presented in the 
previous section. Before and after event analysis, such as in Eichengreen et al. (1995) 
or Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado (2000), cannot discern whether the impact of the 
crisis on output growth is the result of the depreciation or devaluation itself, or is 
instead the consequence of some other concurrent change. First, I present the 
regression results of real output growth on indicator variables of currency crisis, 
devaluation, and depreciation episodes (Table 3.2). All regressions include country 
and year fixed effects.  
The upper panel of Table 3.2 presents the regression results for currency crisis 
episodes. On average, these episodes appear to have been contractionary for the 
sample as a whole, especially for developing countries and in particular for middle 
income economies. On the other hand, output losses associated with currency crises 
are at most mild and statistically insignificant for industrial and non-middle income 
countries.  
Once I disaggregate between devaluations and depreciations (lower panel of Table 
3.2), the output effect continues to be negligible for industrial countries and 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Devaluations, on the other hand, 
seem to be associated with larger output losses than depreciations for middle income 
countries, with an average combined decline in the real output growth rate of about 5 
percent in the year of the event and the year after. This pattern is reversed for non-
middle income countries, with devaluations associated with mild expansions –effect 




In the next set of regressions, I include several control variables –external, fiscal, and 
macroeconomic variables—that have been used in other empirical studies of currency 
crisis episodes or that play an important explanatory role in existing theoretical 
models of currency crisis. Early literature on currency crises such as Krugman (1979) 
and Flood and Garber (1984)) stressed the role played by economic fundamentals as 
determinants of currency crisis episodes. These models typically explained crises as a 
result of inconsistencies in domestic policies, such as a persistent money-financed 
fiscal deficit and a commitment to a pegged exchange rate. The deterioration in 
economic fundamentals could be an indication of a potential crisis. Large fiscal 
deficits, high rates of monetary growth, high inflation, an overvalued real exchange 
rate, large current account deficits or sharp losses of international reserves can be a 
reflection of weak economic fundamentals. Other studies, such as Rodrik and Velasco 
(1999), note that difficulties in rolling over short-term debt could lead to currency and 
debt crises. Therefore, the ratio of short-term debt to foreign reserves is also included 
as a regressor. 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real output. I include in all specifications 
foreign variables  (real US interest rates and average growth in industrial countries), 
monetary and fiscal policy variables (the change in M2 and government consumption 
growth), external sector variables (currency overvaluation, export growth, changes in 
the terms of trade, and openness), and other potentially relevant domestic variables 
(loss in foreign reserves, reserves measured in terms of months of imports, the ratio of 






 Since the focus of this study is to evaluate the output effects of currency 
crisis episodes, I use yearly data for my analysis and I do exclude long-term 
determinants of growth. Many of these variables have been used in other empirical 
studies, particularly in the literature that studies the output effects of currency crises 
(Eichengreen et al. (1995), Aziz et al. (2000), Hutchinson and Noy (2002), Gupta et 
al. (2007)) and the literature that predicts the occurrence of currency crises (Frankel 
and Rose (1996), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), Milessi-Ferreti and Razin 
(1998), Berg and Patillo (1999)). Results are shown in the tables below. 
Table 3.3 presents regression results for currency crisis episodes. All regressions 
include country fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) show regression results for 
developing countries, columns (3) and (4) show the results for middle income 
countries, and columns (5) and (6) present the results for non-middle income 
countries.  
The coefficients on the real interest rate in the US and the weighted average growth in 
G7-countries are statistically significant with the correct sign for developing countries 
and for middle income economies. While the sign of the coefficient on the real 
interest rate in the US remain negative for non-middle income economies, it is 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. External sector variables such as 
export growth, the change in the terms of trade, the openness of the economy to trade, 
and the overvaluation of the currency all have the right sign and in most cases are 
statistically significant in the regressions. 
For developing countries, the coefficients for currency crisis episodes are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that currency crises are 
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associated on impact with output losses. Output growth falls by 1.3% during currency 
crisis episodes (Column (1)). The decline in output is more pronounced when the year 
following the currency crisis is included. The combined decline in output growth 
between the year of the crisis and the posterior year amounts to 2.5%. As shown in 
columns (3) and (4), this result is mainly driven by the subsample of middle income 
countries, with output growth falling by as much as 4.2%. For non-middle income 
countries, the drop in output following a crisis is around 0.5% during the first year, 
and is statistically insignificant. Column (6) also suggests that currency crisis 
episodes are slightly expansionary after one year, but the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. The difference in magnitude of output losses across middle income and 
non-middle income countries is consistent with previous findings. Gupta et al. (2007) 
explore the relationship between output growth and currency crises for developing 
countries for the period 1970-2000 and they find that output contractions during 
currency crisis episodes are larger in magnitude for more developed economies 
relative to less developed ones.  
We estimate the same specification as in Table 3.3, but this time separating currency 
crisis episodes between depreciations and devaluations. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 
3.4 show that depreciations and devaluations are associated with declines in output 
for developing and middle income countries. The coefficients on the depreciation and 
devaluation dummies are statistically significant at conventional levels. Depreciation 
episodes seem to have only a contemporaneous effect, whereas devaluations reduce 
output growth in both the year of the event and the year after. Columns (3) and (4) 




both devaluations and depreciations are larger in magnitude in this group of countries 
(-2.3% in year one and -3.2% in year 2 for devaluations against -1.7% and -0.8% for 
depreciations, but this last coefficient is statistically insignificant). A Wald test 
indicates that devaluations are associated with a larger decline in output than 
depreciations (during the year of the crisis and the year following the crisis), and this 
difference is statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.055). The 
output effect of devaluation and depreciation episodes is not precisely estimated in 
columns (5) and (6) for non-middle income economies. The coefficients are smaller 
in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 control for the effects of banking crises using an indicator variable 
borrowed from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Systemic banking sector problems are 
generally associated with a credit crunch and contraction in economic activity. Output 
losses following banking crises can be amplified due to information asymmetries and 
credit market imperfections (see Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997) for theoretical models of the credit channel). If banking crisis episodes 
are concentrated around devaluation (depreciation) episodes, then the findings in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 may be just a reflection of output losses associated with banking 
sector problems and constrained credit conditions for domestic firms rather than the 
impact attributable to devaluations or depreciations. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
point that twin crisis episodes (joint currency and banking crisis) are far more severe 
and costly in terms of output than currency crisis episodes occurring in isolation, and 




As expected, the coefficients on the banking crisis indicators are statistically 
significant for both middle income and non-middle income countries, with the output 
effects for former showing with one period lag, while the effects for the latter 
appearing contemporaneously. A Wald test for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on devaluation and depreciation episodes are of the same magnitude 
(both for the year of the event and the following year) is rejected at conventional 
significance levels (p-value of 0.08). Even with the inclusion of the banking crisis 
dummies, devaluation episodes seem to lead to more severe contractions. Overall, 
results including banking crises are similar to those obtained in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. 
Regression results in Table 3.6 are in line with previous findings. The combined 
decline in output growth for devaluation episodes is about 5.1% (column (4)) for 
middle income countries. On the other hand, depreciations only exert a 
contemporaneous effect on output growth (-1.6%).  
 
3.5 Robustness Checks 
 
I perform several robustness checks using different definitions of currency crises. In 
the previous sections, I defined a currency crisis episode as a 15% increase in the 
nominal exchange rate, but I excluded all those episodes classified as “freely falling” 
in the RR classification. These episodes that fall into the “freely falling” crisis 
episodes consist of episodes that were preceded by high inflation (above 40% annual 
inflation). The main reason for excluding them in the previous section was to 




characterized by high inflation and poor macroeconomic and monetary management. 
Regression results presented in the middle panel of Table 3.7 include all these 
episodes. A quick comparison with the upper panel –which shows the benchmark 
specification corresponding to Table 3.6—suggests that results are in line with 
previous findings. 
Second, I use the Frankel and Rose (1996) definition of a currency crisis. They define 
a currency crisis as “a large change of the nominal exchange rate that is also a 
substantial increase in the rate of change of nominal depreciation.” They use the 
following criteria: a) a depreciation of the local currency of at least 25%, and b) the 
change in the exchange rate should exceed the previous year’s change by at least 
10%. Results are shown in the bottom panel of Table 3.7. As expected, the 
coefficients are larger in magnitude relative to the benchmark specification, and 
statistically significant at the 1% level and with the expected sign for the sample of 
middle income countries. Larger currency collapses are likely to be linked to 
heightened uncertainty and economic turmoil. If firms in middle income countries are 
subject to liability dollarization, a larger depreciation of the local currency (from 15% 
to 25%) is likely to cause far more severe balance sheet effects, non-performing loans 
and an increased number of bankruptcies.  
Finally, columns (5) through (8) in Table 3.7 report the regression results using an 
alternative country classification. Here, I distinguish between emerging and non-
emerging countries using the EMBI Global (JP Morgan). With this classification, the 
coefficients on the depreciation episodes dummies are not precisely estimated in the 




coefficients on the devaluation episodes dummies are larger in magnitude compared 
to the benchmark classification of developing countries (middle income and non-
middle income countries) and are statistically significant at conventional levels with 
the expected sign. These results are consistent with my previous findings.  
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, I compare the output effects of large devaluations and depreciations. 
First, I define currency crises using a standard definition found in the literature. 
Second, I classify these currency crises into devaluations and depreciations. Then, I 
compare the output effects across episodes. For developing economies, the majority 
of the currency crisis episodes have been contractionary for the 1970-2007. These 
results are consistent with previous studies (Gupta et al. (2007)). These findings are 
mainly driven by the subsample of middle income countries. The distinction is 
important because middle income and emerging economies are more open to 
international credit markets and receive a larger proportion of portfolio capital 
inflows, making them vulnerable to capital flows reversals and sharp depreciations of 
their exchange rates.  
When I disaggregate between devaluation and depreciation episodes, devaluations 
have been on average more contractionary than depreciations for middle income and 
emerging market economies, with a combined decline in output growth of 5.5% (and 
5.1% after controlling for banking crises). Depreciations, on the other hand, appear to 




percentage points in output growth) during the initial year of the currency crisis 
episode. The effect of the following year is statistically insignificant at conventional 
levels.  
I interpret these results as follows. Middle income countries are in general subject to 
liability dollarization and currency mismatches. As a result, they may opt for an 
exchange rate regime that exhibits relatively more stability. However, in the case of a 
collapse in the exchange rate, the output effect is likely to be larger. This result is also 
supported by the fact that the magnitude of the coefficients are much larger when I 
use Frankel and Rose (1996) definition of currency crisis episodes, which utilizes a 


















Currency crisis Devaluations Depreciations
Average change in growth -0.0097 -0.0085 -0.0113
Obs. 240 138 102
Episodes with positive growth 111 71 40
Episodes with negative growth 129 67 62
Currency crisis Devaluations Depreciations
Average change in growth -0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0041
Obs. 58 41 17
Episodes with positive growth 30 25 5
Episodes with negative growth 28 16 12
Currency crisis Devaluations Depreciations
Average change in growth -0.0123 -0.0120 -0.0128
Obs. 182 97 85
Episodes with positive growth 81 46 35
Episodes with negative growth 101 51 50
Currency crisis Devaluations Depreciations
Average change in growth -0.0183 -0.0253 -0.0110
Obs. 106 54 52
Episodes with positive growth 44 22 22
Episodes with negative growth 62 32 30
Currency crisis Devaluations Depreciations
Average change in growth -0.0040 0.0048 -0.0156
Obs. 76 43 33
Episodes with positive growth 37 24 13
Episodes with negative growth 39 19 20
Note: Average growth is the difference between the average real output growth of the two years
prior to the currency crisis and the average real output growth of the year of the crisis and the
following year
Economic performance after a currency crisis















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Currency Crisis -0.0128*** -0.0122*** -0.0037 -0.0033 -0.0135*** -0.0131*** -0.0159*** -0.0148*** -0.0101 -0.0094
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0064)
Currency Crisis (-1) -0.0112*** -0.0028 -0.0135*** -0.0241*** 0.0016
(0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0057) (0.0049)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3611 3521 929 921 2682 2600 1572 1522 1110 1078
adj. R-sq 0.152 0.156 0.363 0.368 0.141 0.143 0.162 0.171 0.104 0.102
Devaluation -0.0101** -0.0110** -0.0044 -0.0035 -0.0095 -0.0113* -0.0189** -0.0216** 0.0030 0.0047
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0068) (0.0070)
Devaluation (-1) -0.0097** -0.0014 -0.0121** -0.0277*** 0.0086
(0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0083) (0.0054)
Depreciation -0.0164*** -0.0140*** -0.0023 -0.0029 -0.0179*** -0.0153*** -0.0128* -0.0073 -0.0270*** -0.0277***
(0.0051) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0076) (0.0055) (0.0101) (0.0106)
Depreciation (-1) -0.0132*** -0.0057 -0.0151*** -0.0202*** -0.0076
(0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0057) (0.0075) (0.0084)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3611 3521 929 921 2682 2600 1572 1522 1110 1078
adj. R-sq 0.152 0.156 0.362 0.367 0.141 0.143 0.161 0.172 0.109 0.108
Note: The dependent variable is the annual growth in real GDP for 1970-2007. Columns (1)-(2) show the results for all countries. Columns (3)-
(4) show the results for high income countries. Columns (5)-(6) show the resuls for developing countries. Columns (7)-(8) show the results for
middle income countries. Columns (9)-(10) show the results for non-middle income countries. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
All countries Industrial
Sorting currency crises into devaluations and depreciations
Currency crises, devaluations, depreciations, and growth


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real US interest -0.1676*** -0.1649*** -0.1902*** -0.1817*** -0.0699 -0.0622
(0.0572) (0.0577) (0.0664) (0.0651) (0.1003) (0.1007)
G7 growth 0.3798*** 0.3986*** 0.3818*** 0.3914*** 0.3732** 0.3949**
(0.1071) (0.1080) (0.1337) (0.1344) (0.1720) (0.1720)
∆ Terms-of-Trade 0.0824*** 0.0817*** 0.1095*** 0.1084*** 0.0550*** 0.0576***
(0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0135) (0.0135)
Openness (-1) 0.0105** 0.0076 0.0138** 0.0119* 0.0080 0.0046
(0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0076) (0.0081)
Export growth (-1) 0.0369*** 0.0359*** 0.0253 0.0250 0.0291** 0.0321**
(0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0146) (0.0151)
Overvaluation (-1) -0.0085* -0.0067 -0.0200*** -0.0177*** 0.0090 0.0098
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0067)
Res. as month of M -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0015
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014)
ST Debt to Res. 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
CA to GDP (-1) 0.0568* 0.0568* 0.1214*** 0.1106** 0.0047 0.0176
(0.0314) (0.0323) (0.0434) (0.0452) (0.0413) (0.0414)
Reserves loss 0.0021 0.0032 0.0016 0.0027 0.0020 0.0023
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)
M2 growth (-1) -0.0031 0.0022 0.0289*** 0.0333*** -0.0074** -0.0038**
(0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0036) (0.0016)
Gov. cons. gth (-1) 0.0099 0.0096 0.0072 0.0066 0.0169 0.0220
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0163) (0.0170)
Currency cris is -0.0125*** -0.0138*** -0.0178*** -0.0206*** -0.0053 -0.0034
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0071)
Currency cris is (-1) -0.0109** -0.0212*** 0.0085
(0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0059)
Constant 0.0241 0.0288* 0.0184 0.0232 -0.0025 -0.0027
(0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0156) (0.0167) (0.0195) (0.0198)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1438 1400 895 874 543 526
adj. R-sq 0.238 0.248 0.336 0.354 0.133 0.146
Non-middle income
Note: The dependent variable is the annual growth in the real GDP in the period 1970-2007.
Columns (1)-(2) show the resuls for developing countries. Columns (3)-(4) show the results for
middle income countries. Columns (5)-(6) show the results for non-middle income countries.
Heterokesdacity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real US interest -0.1678*** -0.1607*** -0.1900*** -0.1783*** -0.0744 -0.0676
(0.0572) (0.0575) (0.0665) (0.0647) (0.1002) (0.1012)
G7 growth 0.3807*** 0.4000*** 0.3772*** 0.3824*** 0.3623** 0.3831**
(0.1072) (0.1082) (0.1331) (0.1336) (0.1727) (0.1732)
∆ Terms-of-Trade 0.0823*** 0.0812*** 0.1096*** 0.1073*** 0.0544*** 0.0571***
(0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0133)
Openness (-1) 0.0105** 0.0083 0.0142** 0.0137** 0.0093 0.0059
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0077) (0.0082)
Export growth (-1) 0.0370*** 0.0365*** 0.0254 0.0261 0.0299** 0.0330**
(0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0147) (0.0152)
Overvaluation (-1) -0.0084* -0.0067 -0.0202*** -0.0179*** 0.0093 0.0102
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0067)
Res. as month of M -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0015
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014)
ST Debt to Res. 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
CA to GDP (-1) 0.0571* 0.0565* 0.1206*** 0.1061** 0.0068 0.0194
(0.0314) (0.0324) (0.0434) (0.0459) (0.0413) (0.0415)
Reserves loss 0.0020 0.0032 0.0017 0.0029 0.0017 0.0019
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038)
M2 growth (-1) -0.0031 0.0025 0.0287*** 0.0341*** -0.0074** -0.0039**
(0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0036) (0.0016)
Gov. cons. gth (-1) 0.0099 0.0093 0.0072 0.0065 0.0181 0.0235
(0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0164) (0.0172)
Devaluation -0.0111* -0.0127** -0.0207*** -0.0234*** 0.0011 0.0029
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0087) (0.0087)
Devaluation (-1) -0.0160** -0.0316*** 0.0090
(0.0074) (0.0110) (0.0065)
Depreciation -0.0144*** -0.0153*** -0.0142** -0.0166*** -0.0159 -0.0136
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0109) (0.0111)
Depreciation (-1) -0.0038 -0.0084 0.0078
(0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0106)
Constant 0.0242 0.0276* 0.0179 0.0200 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0200) (0.0204)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1438 1400 895 874 543 526
adj. R-sq 0.238 0.249 0.336 0.358 0.134 0.145
Developing Middle income Non-middle income
Note: The dependent variable is the annual growth in the real GDP in the period 1970-2007.
Columns (1)-(2) show the resuls for developing countries. Columns (3)-(4) show the results for
middle-income countries. Columns (5)-(6) show the results for non-middle income countries.
Heterokesdacity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real US interest -0.1545*** -0.1530*** -0.1785*** -0.1724*** -0.0597 -0.0515
(0.0568) (0.0574) (0.0659) (0.0650) (0.1004) (0.1005)
G7 growth 0.3698*** 0.3902*** 0.3640*** 0.3758*** 0.3860** 0.4114**
(0.1060) (0.1067) (0.1328) (0.1332) (0.1691) (0.1693)
∆ Terms-of-Trade 0.0830*** 0.0824*** 0.1102*** 0.1088*** 0.0551*** 0.0583***
(0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0135)
Openness (-1) 0.0097* 0.0070 0.0133** 0.0116* 0.0070 0.0034
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0076) (0.0080)
Export growth (-1) 0.0350*** 0.0339*** 0.0236 0.0237 0.0274* 0.0284*
(0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0144) (0.0146)
Overvaluation (-1) -0.0084* -0.0070 -0.0199*** -0.0179*** 0.0090 0.0097
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0066)
Res. as month of M -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0014
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014)
ST Debt to Res. 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
CA to GDP (-1) 0.0530* 0.0530 0.1160*** 0.1059** 0.0036 0.0167
(0.0318) (0.0327) (0.0440) (0.0460) (0.0411) (0.0411)
Reserves loss 0.0021 0.0031 0.0016 0.0026 0.0021 0.0024
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)
M2 growth (-1) -0.0034 0.0019 0.0269*** 0.0323*** -0.0074** -0.0038**
(0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0084) (0.0088) (0.0036) (0.0016)
Gov. cons. gth (-1) 0.0093 0.0092 0.0067 0.0062 0.0170 0.0226
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0162) (0.0169)
Banking crisis -0.0122** -0.0134** -0.0072 -0.0067 -0.0243* -0.0268*
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0141) (0.0144)
Banking crisis (-1) -0.0217*** -0.0227*** -0.0194*** -0.0202*** -0.0194 -0.0209
(0.0080) (0.0082) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0258) (0.0257)
Currency crisis -0.0115*** -0.0126*** -0.0167*** -0.0193*** -0.0050 -0.0031
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0073) (0.0074)
Currency crisis (-1) -0.0094* -0.0194*** 0.0081
(0.0050) (0.0069) (0.0060)
Constant 0.0252* 0.0294* 0.0199 0.0239 0.0008 0.0007
(0.0152) (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.0165) (0.0185) (0.0187)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1438 1400 895 874 543 526
adj. R-sq 0.248 0.259 0.345 0.363 0.141 0.155
Developing Middle income Non-middle income
Note: The dependent variable is the annual growth in the real GDP in the period 1970-2007.
Columns (1)-(2) show the resuls for developing countries. Columns (3)-(4) show the results for
middle-income countries. Columns (5)-(6) show the results for non-middle income countries.
Heterokesdacity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real US interest -0.1548*** -0.1497*** -0.1785*** -0.1696*** -0.0646 -0.0593
(0.0568) (0.0572) (0.0659) (0.0645) (0.1002) (0.1007)
G7 growth 0.3711*** 0.3920*** 0.3605*** 0.3691*** 0.3741** 0.3971**
(0.1061) (0.1069) (0.1323) (0.1325) (0.1696) (0.1701)
∆ Terms-of-Trade 0.0829*** 0.0820*** 0.1102*** 0.1078*** 0.0544*** 0.0578***
(0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0132) (0.0133)
Openness (-1) 0.0096* 0.0075 0.0135** 0.0132** 0.0084 0.0047
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0078) (0.0082)
Export growth (-1) 0.0351*** 0.0344*** 0.0237 0.0247 0.0282* 0.0291**
(0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0145) (0.0148)
Overvaluation (-1) -0.0083* -0.0069 -0.0200*** -0.0180*** 0.0093 0.0100
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0066)
Res. as month of M -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0014
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014)
ST Debt to Res. 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
CA to GDP (-1) 0.0534* 0.0529 0.1154*** 0.1022** 0.0060 0.0184
(0.0318) (0.0328) (0.0440) (0.0466) (0.0411) (0.0411)
Reserves loss 0.0020 0.0031 0.0016 0.0027 0.0017 0.0018
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038)
M2 growth (-1) -0.0034 0.0022 0.0267*** 0.0331*** -0.0074** -0.0040***
(0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0036) (0.0015)
Gov. cons. gth (-1) 0.0093 0.0090 0.0066 0.0061 0.0184 0.0247
(0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0163) (0.0171)
Banking crisis -0.0123** -0.0133** -0.0071 -0.0060 -0.0254* -0.0280*
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0140) (0.0145)
Banking crisis (-1) -0.0218*** -0.0224*** -0.0193*** -0.0195*** -0.0198 -0.0215
(0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0072) (0.0068) (0.0256) (0.0256)
Devaluation -0.0095 -0.0106* -0.0190** -0.0215*** 0.0023 0.0043
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0093)
Devaluation (-1) -0.0137* -0.0291*** 0.0096
(0.0072) (0.0107) (0.0068)
Depreciation -0.0143*** -0.0150*** -0.0138** -0.0161*** -0.0171 -0.0149
(0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0109) (0.0110)
Depreciation (-1) -0.0035 -0.0075 0.0059
(0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0106)
Constant 0.0254* 0.0285* 0.0195 0.0210 0.0041 0.0047
(0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0189) (0.0190)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1438 1400 895 874 543 526
adj. R-sq 0.248 0.260 0.344 0.366 0.143 0.156
Developing Middle income Non-middle income
Devaluations, depreciations, banking crises, and growth
Note: The dependent variable is the annual growth in the real GDP in the period 1970-2007.
Columns (1)-(2) show the resuls for developing countries. Columns (3)-(4) show the results for
middle income countries. Columns (5)-(6) show the results for non-middle income countries.
Heterokesdacity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Devaluation -0.0190** -0.0215*** 0.0023 0.0043 -0.0184** -0.0214** -0.0028 -0.0015
(0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0078) (0.0079)
Devaluation (-1) -0.0291*** 0.0096 -0.0386*** 0.0068
(0.0107) (0.0068) (0.0130) (0.0056)
Depreciation -0.0138** -0.0161*** -0.0171 -0.0149 -0.0077 -0.0101 -0.0241*** -0.0224**
(0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0090) (0.0091)
Depreciation (-1) -0.0075 0.0059 -0.0103 0.0058
(0.0070) (0.0106) (0.0079) (0.0088)
Devaluation -0.0169** -0.0195*** 0.0021 0.0040 -0.0180* -0.0210** -0.0031 -0.0018
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0078) (0.0078)
Devaluation (-1) -0.0296*** 0.0096 -0.0374*** 0.0081
(0.0108) (0.0067) (0.0128) (0.0054)
Depreciation -0.0126** -0.0141** -0.0171** -0.0150* -0.0074 -0.0096 -0.0223*** -0.0208***
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0062) (0.0063)
Depreciation (-1) -0.0004 0.0072 -0.0019 0.0064
(0.0054) (0.0081) (0.0067) (0.0063)
Devaluation -0.0397*** -0.0426*** -0.0033 -0.0010 -0.0411*** -0.0434*** -0.0103 -0.0080
(0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0119)
Devaluation (-1) -0.0421*** 0.0160* -0.0490*** 0.0151*
(0.0147) (0.0094) (0.0165) (0.0080)
Depreciation -0.0276*** -0.0279*** -0.0107 -0.0106 -0.0284*** -0.0282*** -0.0199* -0.0190*
(0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Depreciation (-1) -0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0057 0.0062
(0.0097) (0.0188) (0.0114) (0.0143)
Devaluations, depreciations, banking crises, and growth
Emerging Non-emerging
Note: The dependent variable is the annual growth in the real GDP in the period 1970-2007. Columns (1)-(2) show the
resuls for middle incomes countries. Columns (3)-(4) show the results for non-middle income countries. Columns (5)-
(6) show the results for emerging economies. Columns (7)-(8) show the results for non-emerging economies.
Heterokesdacity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1
percent respectively. In Frankel and Rose (1996), a currency crisis requires two conditions: 1) a depreciation of the
currency of at least 25 percent, and 2) at least a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation. Emerging countries are
classified using the EMBI Global (J.P. Morgan).
Benchmark
Including regimes classified as freely falling in RR 
Using Frankel and Rose (1996) definition of currency crises













Real GDP growth Annual  rea l  GDP growth World Development 
Indicators  (2009)
G7 growth Annual  rea l  GDP growth of G7 countries , GDP weigthed average World Development 
Indicators  (2009)
Real US interest rate Real  US Federal  Funds  rate Internationa l  Financial  
Stati stics  (2009)
Terms-of-trade Exports  as  capaci ty of imports  in cons tant loca l  currency uni ts World Development 
Indicators  (2009)
Openness Ratio of exports  plus  imports  to GDP World Development 
Indicators  (2009)
Export growth Growth of rea l  exports World Development 
Indicators  (2009)
Overvaluation Deviation from the average bi la tera l  exchange rate over the period Internationa l  Financial  
Stati stics  (2009)
Reserves in months of
imports
Total  reserves  in months  of imports World Development 
Indicators  (2009)
CA to GDP Current account ba lance to GDP World Development 
Indicators  (2009)




Short-term debt to tota l  res erves World Development 
Indicators  (2009)




Real  genera l  government final  cons umption expenditure growth World Development 
Indicators  (2009)
Banking crisis Dummy variable for banking cri s i s  episodes Reihart and Rogoff (2008)
Currency crisis Dummy variable for currency cris i s epis odes, defined as an annual increase
in the nomina l exchange rate (express ed as domes tic currency per unit of
base currency) of at least 15 percent, excluding epis odes clas s i fied as freely
fa l l ing and those that lacked para l lel  exchange rate data
Internationa l  Financial  
Stati stics  (IFS) and I l zetzki , 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)
Depreciation Dummy variable for depreciation epis odes , defined as a cris i s episodes in
which the country was  running a  float/s emi-float.
Internationa l  Financial  
Stati stics  (IFS) and I l zetzki , 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)
Devaluation Dummy variable for deva luation episodes, defined as a cris i s episodes in
which the country was  running a  pegged/s emi-pegged.
Internationa l  Financial  
Stati stics  (IFS) and I l zetzki , 





















Aus tra l i a 1976 1 0 1 Centra l  African Republ ic 1994 1 0 1
Aus tra l i a 1982 1 0 1 Chad 1994 1 0 1
Aus tra l i a 1997 1 1 0 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2000 1 1 0
Aus tria 2005 1 0 1 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2004 1 1 0
Belgium 1982 1 0 1 Cote d'Ivoire* 1994 1 0 1
Belgium 2005 1 0 1 Ethiopia 1992 1 0 1
Brunei 1997 1 0 1 Gambi a, The 1991 1 1 0
Cyprus 1976 1 0 1 Gambi a, The 2000 1 0 1
Cyprus 1986 1 0 1 Ghana 1992 1 1 0
Finland 1977 1 0 1 Ghana 2000 1 1 0
Finland 1982 1 0 1 Guinea 1991 1 0 1
Finland 1992 1 0 1 Guinea 1999 1 0 1
Finland 2005 1 0 1 Guinea 2004 1 1 0
France 1976 1 0 1 Guinea-Bi ss au 1983 1 0 1
France 2005 1 0 1 Guinea-Bi ss au 1987 1 0 1
Germany 1981 1 1 0 Guinea-Bi ss au 1991 1 0 1
Germany 1997 1 1 0 Haiti 1991 1 1 0
Germany 2005 1 0 1 Haiti 2000 1 1 0
Greece 1975 1 0 1 Haiti 2005 1 1 0
Greece 1980 1 0 1 India 1984 1 0 1
Greece 1985 1 1 0 India 1988 1 0 1
Greece 2005 1 0 1 India 1993 1 0 1
Hong Kong, China 1983 1 0 1 Kenya 1981 1 0 1
Iceland 1986 1 1 0 Kenya 1985 1 0 1
Iceland 2001 1 0 1 Kenya 1990 1 1 0
Iceland 2006 1 1 0 Kenya 1995 1 1 0
Ireland 2005 1 0 1 Kenya 1999 1 0 1
Israel 1971 1 0 1 Lao PDR 1987 1 1 0
Israel 1989 1 0 1 Lao PDR 1995 1 0 1
Israel 1998 1 1 0 Madagascar 1984 1 0 1
Ita ly 1976 1 0 1 Madagascar 1991 1 1 0
Ita ly 1992 1 0 1 Madagascar 2002 1 1 0
Ita ly 2005 1 0 1 Malawi 1982 1 1 0
Japan 1979 1 1 0 Malawi 1986 1 1 0
Luxembourg 1982 1 0 1 Malawi 1992 1 1 0
Luxembourg 2005 1 0 1 Malawi 1997 1 0 1
Ma lta 1992 1 1 0 Malawi 2002 1 1 0
Netherlands 2005 1 0 1 Mal i 1994 1 0 1
New Zea land 1975 1 0 1 Mauri tania 1984 1 0 1
New Zea land 1984 1 0 1 Mauri tania 1992 1 1 0
New Zea land 1988 1 1 0 Mauri tania 1997 1 0 1
Norway 1982 1 1 0 Mongol ia 1991 1 1 0
Norway 1986 1 1 0 Mozambi que 1995 1 0 1
Norway 2003 1 1 0 Mozambi que 2000 1 0 1
Portugal 1976 1 1 0 Mozambi que 2005 1 0 1
Portugal 1982 1 0 1 Myanmar 1971 1 0 1
Portugal 1986 1 0 1 Myanmar 1975 1 0 1
Portugal 2005 1 0 1 Nepal 1984 1 0 1
Singapore 1997 1 1 0 Nepal 1988 1 0 1
Spai n 1976 1 0 1 Niger 1994 1 0 1
Spai n 1982 1 0 1 Nigeria* 1981 1 1 0
Spai n 1993 1 0 1 Nigeria* 1989 1 1 0
Spai n 2005 1 0 1 Nigeria* 1999 1 1 0
Sweden 1977 1 0 1 Pakis tan 1982 1 0 1
Sweden 1982 1 0 1 Pakis tan 1993 1 0 1
Sweden 1992 1 0 1 Papua New Gui nea 1994 1 0 1
Trinidad and Tobago 1993 1 0 1 Papua New Gui nea 1998 1 0 1
United Kingdom 1975 1 1 0 Senegal 1994 1 0 1
United Kingdom 1981 1 1 0 Sudan 1991 1 0 1
United Kingdom 1992 1 0 1 Sudan 1995 1 0 1
Tanzania 1991 1 1 0
Tanzania 1999 1 0 1
Benin 1994 1 0 1 Togo 1994 1 0 1
Burkina  Fas o 1994 1 0 1 Uganda 1989 1 0 1
Burundi 1983 1 0 1 Uganda 1998 1 1 0
Burundi 1988 1 1 0 Zambia 1985 1 1 0
Burundi 1992 1 1 0 Zambia 2006 1 1 0
Burundi 1996 1 1 0 Zimbabwe 1982 1 0 1
Burundi 2000 1 1 0 Zimbabwe 1988 1 1 0
Zimbabwe 1997 1 1 0
High income countries Developing non-middle income countries (cont.)

















Albania 1997 1 1 0 Ira n, Is l amic Rep. 1993 1 1 0
Algeria* 1988 1 1 0 Ira n, Is l amic Rep. 2000 1 1 0
Algeria* 1994 1 1 0 Jamaica 1978 1 0 1
Algeria* 2002 1 0 1 Jamaica 1983 1 0 1
Argentina* 1971 1 0 1 Jamaica 1989 1 0 1
Argentina* 2002 1 0 1 Jamaica 2003 1 0 1
Azerbai jan 1993 1 1 0 Jordan* 1988 1 0 1
Bol ivia 1972 1 1 0 Kaza khs ta n 1999 1 0 1
Bol ivia 1979 1 1 0 Korea, Rep.* 1971 1 1 0
Bol ivia 1989 1 0 1 Korea, Rep.* 1980 1 0 1
Brazil* 1974 1 1 0 Korea, Rep.* 1997 1 0 1
Brazil* 1999 1 0 1 Macedoni a , FYR 1997 1 0 1
Bulgaria* 1990 1 1 0 Malaysia* 1997 1 0 1
Cameroon 1994 1 0 1 Mauritius 1983 1 1 0
Chile* 1971 1 1 0 Mauritius 1997 1 0 1
Chile* 1982 1 0 1 Mexico* 1976 1 0 1
Chile* 1987 1 1 0 Mexico* 1982 1 0 1
China* 1984 1 1 0 Mexico* 1994 1 0 1
China* 1989 1 1 0 Mexico* 1998 1 1 0
China* 1994 1 0 1 Mol dova 1998 1 0 1
Colombia* 1974 1 1 0 Morocco* 1985 1 0 1
Colombia* 1980 1 0 1 Ni cara gua 1979 1 0 1
Colombia* 1984 1 0 1 Ni cara gua 1993 1 0 1
Colombia* 1988 1 1 0 Paraguay 1984 1 1 0
Colombia* 1995 1 1 0 Paraguay 1989 1 1 0
Colombia* 1999 1 1 0 Paraguay 1993 1 0 1
Congo, Rep. 1994 1 0 1 Paraguay 1998 1 0 1
Costa Rica* 1974 1 1 0 Paraguay 2002 1 1 0
Costa Rica* 1981 1 0 1 Peru* 1998 1 0 1
Costa Rica* 1987 1 1 0 Philippines* 1970 1 0 1
Costa Rica* 1991 1 1 0 Philippines* 1983 1 1 0
Costa Rica* 1995 1 0 1 Philippines* 1990 1 0 1
Croatia* 1993 1 1 0 Philippines* 1997 1 0 1
Dominican Republic* 1985 1 1 0 Poland* 2003 1 1 0
Dominican Republic* 2002 1 0 1 Seychel les 2007 1 0 1
Ecuador* 1970 1 0 1 South Africa* 1975 1 1 0
Ecuador* 1982 1 0 1 South Africa* 1981 1 1 0
Ecuador* 1986 1 1 0 South Africa* 1985 1 1 0
Ecuador* 1995 1 1 0 South Africa* 1996 1 1 0
Egypt, Arab Rep.* 1979 1 1 0 South Africa* 2000 1 1 0
Egypt, Arab Rep.* 1989 1 1 0 Sri  La nka 1977 1 0 1
Egypt, Arab Rep.* 2001 1 0 1 Sri  La nka 1983 1 0 1
El Salvador* 1986 1 1 0 Sri  La nka 1989 1 0 1
El Salvador* 1990 1 1 0 Syrian Arab Republ i c 1988 1 1 0
Equatoria l  Guinea 1994 1 0 1 Thailand* 1984 1 0 1
Gabon 1994 1 0 1 Thailand* 1997 1 0 1
Guyana 1981 1 0 1 Tunisia* 1986 1 0 1
Honduras 1990 1 1 0 Turkey* 1970 1 1 0
Honduras 1994 1 1 0 Turkey* 1977 1 1 0
Hungary* 1985 1 1 0 Turkey* 2000 1 1 0
Hungary* 1989 1 1 0 Turkey* 2006 1 1 0
Hungary* 1994 1 1 0 Uruguay* 1980 1 0 1
Hungary* 1998 1 0 1 Uruguay* 1992 1 0 1
Indonesia* 1970 1 1 0 Uruguay* 2001 1 0 1
Indonesia* 1978 1 1 0 Venezuela, RB* 1984 1 1 0
Indonesia* 1983 1 0 1 Venezuela, RB* 1993 1 1 0
Indonesia* 1997 1 0 1 Venezuela, RB* 2002 1 0 1
Note: A currency cris is is defi ned as a n annual increas e in the exchange rate (expres s ed as domes tic currency per unit of forei gn currency) of at leas t 15
percent. Depreciation and devaluation epis odes are cris is epi sodes in which the country wa s running a pegged/s emi-pegged or a fl oat/semi -float according
to the Reinhart and Rogoff clas s i fication. Epis odes characterized by Reinhart and Rogoff a s freely fa l l i ng and thos e tha t lacked para l le l exchange rate data
have been excluded from thi s l i s t. The dis ti ncti on between high income, developing mi ddle income, and developing non-middle income countries is done
us ing the World Bank income clas s i fi cati on (2009). The as teri ck (*) indicates  an emerging market usi ng the EMBI  Global  by J.P. Morgan.









Middle income countries 
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